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THE ENFORCEABILITY AFTER EMANCIPATION OF DEBTS
CONTRACTED FOR THE PURCHASE OF SLAVES
ANDREW KULL*
INTRODUCTION
What should be the effect of the abolition of slavery on outstand-
ing debts for the purchase of slaves? The question, intensely contro-
versial during a brief period of Reconstruction, gave rise to an
intricate final chapter in the American law of slavery. Viewing the
problem first as a matter of commercial law, courts in every southern
state but one held that emancipation had no effect on debts for slaves.
The United States Supreme Court took the same view. When six for-
mer slave states enacted constitutions and ordinances barring the en-
forcement of contracts for "slave consideration," four of the five state
courts that passed on the question held that such prohibitions violated
the federal Constitution, being state laws "impairing the obligation of
contracts." Again the United States Supreme Court agreed. Of the
few modem commentators who have noticed this old controversy,
most see in the courts' reaction a grudging attitude toward the scope
of the Thirteenth Amendment and the work of Reconstruction.1
The question was inevitably more complex. The immediate con-
troversy in each case, after all, was not between slavery and freedom,
but between two former slaveholders. One was a debtor, the other a
* Professor of Law, Emory University. The author has profited from the generous com-
ments and helpful suggestions of Michael A. Bellesiles, John F. Burleigh, Richard Epstein, Paul
Finkelman, George Fredrickson, Robert W. Gordon, Ariela Gross, Richard W. Hulbert, Richard
S. Kay, and Richard H. Kilbourne, Jr.
1. For Professors Hyman and Wiecek,
the fact that any judges at all blessed the slave contracts gave credence to arguments
that no revolution in federalism had occurred by reason of the Thirteenth Amendment;
that the Constitution's contract clause took precedence over the Bill of Rights and the
Thirteenth Amendment; and that the Civil Rights and Freedmen's Bureau laws had
limited impacts.
HAROLD M. HYMAN & WILLIAM M. WIECEK, EQUAL JUSTICE UNDER LAW 428 (1982). Profes-
sor Soifer similarly sees in these decisions a "use of everyday legal doctrines to confine or reject
the freedom guaranteed in the thirteenth amendment." Aviam Soifer, Reviewing Legal Fictions,
20 GA. L. REV. 871, 890 (1986). Richard Kilbourne makes the very different observation that in
Louisiana, whose Reconstruction-era courts were the first to refuse to enforce promissory notes
given for slaves, "The supreme court's largely unenunciated policy was to preserve the planta-
tion as the basic unit of production in the hands of its prewar owner." RICHARD H. KILBOURNE,
JR., DEBT, INVESTMENT, SLAVES: CREDIT RELATIONS IN EAST FELICIANA PARISH, LOUISIANA
1825-1885, at 9 (1995).
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creditor; one a buyer, the other a seller of slaves at the twilight of the
institution of slavery. The decision whether to enforce a promissory
note given for slaves may possibly have obliged courts to pass retro-
spective judgment on a legal regime that permitted property in human
beings, though whether it had this significance in the view of contem-
poraries depended very much upon the observer. What was unmis-
takable was that a refusal to enforce the note reversed the transaction
between the last buyer and the last seller, back-dating the effective
date of freedom so as to shift the loss from the party who had lost by
emancipation to the party who had thought to escape its effects.
Southerners who debated the status of slave contracts were acutely
aware of this relationship; among the reasons for the broad movement
to prohibit the enforcement of slave contracts, a determination to
favor buyers over sellers in the last slave transactions was probably as
significant as the impulse to pass judgment on a former state of things.
Two very different reasons for doing the same thing appealed, predict-
ably, to two very different groups.
The first part of the following discussion introduces the different
strands of the "slave consideration" controversy and explains how it
turned out. The second part summarizes the arguments that were ad-
vanced on either side of the enforceability issue-in the courts, in
state constitutional conventions, and (briefly) in the United States
Congress. The final section suggests the range of motivations that lay
behind the impulse to deny enforcement of debts for slaves.
I. WHAT THEY DID
The abolition of slavery left many former slaveholders deeply in-
debted for the purchase of property they no longer owned. Those
who were sued on notes given for slaves prior to emancipation re-
sponded that obligations of this character should no longer be en-
forceable. Title to the property had failed-so ran the usual
defense-resulting in a breach of the seller's warranty and a failure of
consideration. Arguments along these lines, framed in terms of the
law of sales, were considered by courts in every state of the former
Confederacy, in several border states, and by the United States
Supreme Court; they were rejected in every jurisdiction save
Louisiana.2 The standard answer to the buyer's plea was that a debt,
2. The following are the principal decisions in the several jurisdictions. (Unless otherwise
indicated, each holds slave debts fully enforceable.)
Alabama: McElvain v. Mudd, 44 Ala. 48 (1870); Fitzpatrick v. Hearne, 44 Ala. 171 (1870).
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arising from a sale that was legal and valid when and where it was
made, was not rendered unenforceable by a supervening change in the
law governing the subject matter of the sale; that destruction of prop-
erty in slaves by emancipation was a risk that passed with the title,
comparable to the risk of loss by illness, casualty, or escape; and that,
as buyers and sellers alike fully appreciated these risks, they set their
prices and took their chances accordingly.3
The question of enforcing "slave contracts" was not confined to
courtrooms. During the winter and spring of 1867-1868, constitutional
conventions assembled in ten of the eleven states of the former Con-
federacy. The convention delegates had been elected under military
supervision, in obedience to the command of the Reconstruction Act,
by the male citizens of each state "of whatever race, color, or previous
condition ... except such as may be disfranchised for participation in
the rebellion."' 4 The inclusion of black voters, the exclusion of anyone
who would not take a congressionally prescribed loyalty oath, and the
initial determination of many white conservatives to boycott the entire
process, produced conventions radically unlike the bodies that had
written the earlier constitutions of the southern states. Their member-
ship was composed largely of northern "carpetbaggers" (both black
Arkansas: Haskill v. Sevier, 25 Ark. 152 (1867), affd, 26 Ark. 133 (1868), error dismissed, 81
U.S. (14 Wall.) 12 (1872); Jacoway v. Denton, 25 Ark. 625 (1869), error dismissed, 154 U.S. 583
(1872).
Florida. Walker v. Gatlin, 12 Fla. 9 (1867); McNealy v. Gregory, 13 Fla. 417 (1870).
Georgia: Hand v. Armstrong, 34 Ga. 232 (1866) (upholding enforceability); Shorter v. Cobb, 39
Ga. 285 (1869) (denying enforcement on basis of state constitutional prohibition); White v. Hart,
39 Ga. 306 (1869) (same), rev'd, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 646 (1872).
Illinois: Roundtree v. Baker, 52 Ill. 241 (1869).
Kentucky: Bailey v. Howard, 2 Ky. Op. 294 (1868).
Louisiana: Wainwright v. Bridges, 19 La. Ann. 234 (1867) (denying enforcement as a matter of
contract law); Palmer v. Marston, 81 U.S. (14 Wall.) 10 (1872).
Mississippi: Bradford v. Jenkins, 41 Miss. 328 (1867).
Missouri: Phillips v. Evans, 38 Mo. 305 (1866).
North Carolina: Harrell v. Watson, 63 N.C. 454 (1869); West v. Hall, 64 N.C. 43 (1870).
South Carolina: Calhoun v. Calhoun, 2 S.C. 283 (1870).
Tennessee: Young v. Thompson, 42 Tenn. (2 Cold.) 596 (1865); Curd v. Bonner, 44 Tenn. (4
Cold.) 632 (1867); Lewis v. Woodfolk, 61 Tenn. 25 (1872).
Texas: The Emancipation Proclamation Cases (Hall v. Keese), 31 Tex. 504 (1868).
Virginia: Scott's Ex'x v. Scott, 59 Va. (18 Gratt.) 150 (1868).
West Virginia: Matthews v. Dunbar, 3 W. Va. 138 (1869).
Federal: Osborn v. Nicholson, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 654 (1872), rev'g 18 F. Cas. 846 (C.C.E.D. Ark.
1870) (No. 10,595); Boyce v. Tabb, 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 546 (1873).
3. The arguments on either side of the enforcement question are more fully discussed in
Part I1 of this article. See infra pp. 507-22.
4. Reconstruction Act of Mar. 2, 1867, ch. 153, § 5, 14 Stat. 428, 429. (Tennessee, alone
among the former confederate states, had already been readmitted to representation in Con-
gress.) Detailed instructions for conducting the elections of convention delegates were set forth
in the Supplementary Reconstruction Act of Mar. 23, 1867, ch. 6, 15 Stat. 2.
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and white); white southern "scalawags"; and those southerners who,
whether free blacks or slaves, had until then been disfranchised alto-
gether. Politically as well as racially, the Reconstruction conventions
had no parallel among lawmaking bodies previously assembled any-
where in the country. The question whether to enforce debts originat-
ing in the hire or purchase of slaves was presented for consideration in
all ten of the Reconstruction conventions; six of the ten acted to pro-
hibit enforcement. The new constitutions of Arkansas, Florida, Geor-
gia, Louisiana, and South Carolina contained provisions denying the
enforceability of slave contracts, while Alabama's constitutional con-
vention enacted an ordinance to the same effect.5
The question of slave contracts was not treated by the conven-
tions in isolation, as involving only the issues peculiar to slavery and
its abolition. Rather, the enforceability of such debts was part of a
broader debate over debt relief generally. "Relief' was the issue that,
more than any other, preoccupied the delegates' deliberations and
their political calculations. The variety of relief measures undertaken
by the conventions included constitutional provisions for homestead
allowances (making real and personal property to a specified value
immune from execution); the abolition of imprisonment for debt; the
passage of "stay laws" suspending for a stated time actions for debt
and the execution of judgments, or else (depending on the conven-
tion's conception of its legislative authority) petitions to the military
authorities requesting that they promulgate orders to the same effect;
and the "scaling" or downward adjustment of debts contracted in con-
federate currency. The most ambitious plans called for an across-the-
board reduction or forgiveness of private debts contracted prior to a
specified date, with exceptions for certain favored categories of obli-
gations, such as wages.6 Proposals to prohibit the enforcement of
slave contracts were usually presented as relief measures-though a
species of relief, assuredly, to which special considerations attached.
Prohibitions limited to slave contracts fared much better in the
conventions than did the more radical debt relief program. Of the five
state constitutions of 1868 that mention debts for slaves, four (Arkan-
5. In Mississippi, North Carolina, and Texas, proposals to restrict the enforcement of slave
contracts were introduced in convention, but made little headway. In Virginia, where the issue
received more extensive consideration, action relating to slave contracts was rejected-along
with proposals for more general debt relief-by a decisive conservative majority. The measures
proposed or adopted in each state are collected in an Appendix following this article. See infra
app. pp. 533-38.
6. The debtor relief measures and other economic reforms considered by the various state
conventions are described in ERIc FONER, RECONSTRUCrION 325-29 (1988).
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sas, Florida, Louisiana, and South Carolina) contain freestanding pro-
visions relating to slave contracts and no general limitation, apart
from the homestead, on the enforceability of other debts. Georgia's
proposed constitution, by contrast, included as its most controversial
provision a blanket nullification of most debts contracted prior to
June 1, 1865. In the course of extended convention debate on the is-
sue of relief generally, a specific ban on the enforcement of debts for
the purchase or hire of slaves was appended as a proviso to Georgia's
broader relief article, by means of a floor amendment accepted with-
out a vote and (judging by the silence of newspaper reports) without
sustained discussion. 7
To the extent that any of these relief measures involved the nulli-
fication of existing indebtedness or the security therefor, they were
open to the objection that such action violated the federal constitu-
tional prohibition of state laws impairing the obligation of contracts.8
In Georgia, and to a lesser extent in other states, debate over the con-
stitutionality of a bar to enforcement of slave debts was commonly
subsumed within the broader question of the constitutionality of relief
measures in general; but there is no doubt that limitations on slave
contracts were understood to raise squarely the constitutional issue.9
The federal constitutional objection to relief or "repudiation," as op-
ponents called it, was already being debated before the conventions
met, in the election campaigns of some of the delegates;10 it was a
principal theme of opposition to relief during the conventions them-
7. The pertinent section of Georgia's 1868 constitution, as originally proposed and ratified,
is set forth in the Appendix. See infra app. pp. 534-35. For the addition of the "slave considera-
tion" proviso (on the motion of Isaac Seeley, carpetbagger and native of New York), see JOUR-
NAL OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE GEORGIA CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION 233 (1868)
[hereinafter GEORGIA CONsT-rUTIONAL CONVENTION] (proceedings of Feb. 4, 1868).
8. U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 10.
9. Thus when the Judiciary Committee of Virginia's constitutional convention reported
unfavorably on a resolution nullifying debts for slaves, it placed its objections primarily on con-
stitutional grounds. See infra app. p. 537.
10. Addressing local voters in the days preceding the election, the foremost opponent of
relief in the Georgia convention, Amos T. Akerman of Elbert County, had written that "much of
this hope of relief is stimulated by ambitious men who are deceiving the people with promises
that never can be fulfilled, well knowing that the judiciary will overturn their work." Letter
dated Oct. 9, 1867, reprinted in DAILY INTELLIGENCER (Atlanta), Dec. 13, 1867, at 2, cols. 1-2.
Akerman, born in 1821 in Portsmouth, New Hampshire, moved south in 1842: first a school
teacher, he later studied and practiced law, settling in Elberton, Georgia. Akerman served as
President Grant's Attorney General in 1870-1871, launching a vigorous prosecution of Ku Klux
Klan violence before his abrupt dismissal amid a controversy over railroad land grants. See
William S. McFeely, Amos T. Akerman: The Lawyer and Racial Justice, in REGION, RACE, AND
RECONSTRUCTION 395 (J. Morgan Kousser & James M. McPherson eds., 1982).
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selves." In Georgia, where the proposed scope of relief was the most
ambitious, its constitutionality became one of the dominant issues in
the post-convention debate over ratification.
All parties in Georgia made the same blunt assessment of the
significance of the relief section to the prospects of a proposed consti-
tution that (in obedience to the requirements of Congress) contained
no racial restrictions on the elective franchise. Relief was the "one
redeeming feature" for "many men who feel but very little interest in
the Constitution we may frame... men who are gentlemen, whole-
souled and honest, who have some prejudice against extending privi-
leges to colored men."'1 2 It was, in other words, "a sugar-coated pill to
assist degenerate Georgians in swallowing the bitter dose of Universal
Suffrage.' 3 Opponents derided the "relief swindle," charging that
Radicals felt free to "put as much 'Relief' in as you please to get
votes," knowing that either Congress or the courts "would have to
knock it out."' 14 Rebutting the charge, former governor Joseph E.
Brown-minence grise of Georgia's Republican party and the leading
spokesman for ratification-argued that relief was secure because the
question of its constitutionality could never reach the courts:
It is said the measure is unconstitutional, and will be set aside
by the courts.... But how are the courts to get at it? The Constitu-
tion gives no court in the State jurisdiction of the question. How is
a Judge to try a case of which he has no jurisdiction?
But it is said the Constitution of the United States forbids any
State to impair the obligation of a contract. This is true, but it does
11. See, e.g., DEBATES AND PROCEEDINGS OF THE VIRGINIA CONSTITUTIONAL CONVEN-
TION 496-98 (1868) [hereinafter VIRGINIA CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION] (report of the Judici-
ary Committee); GEORGIA CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION, supra note 7, at 205-06 (minority
report of the Committee on Relief).
12. W. L. Goodwin of Bartow County, addressing the Georgia convention (Jan. 31, 1868),
DAILY NEW ERA (Atlanta), Feb. 2, 1868, at 2, col. 5. Later in the year, during the Senate debate
on the Omnibus Bill, John Sherman of Ohio referred to the widespread perception that "without
what is called the relief clause in the constitution of Georgia, that constitution would probably
have failed." CONG. GLOBE, 40th Cong., 2d Sess. 2968 (June 9, 1868).
13. DAILY REPUBLICAN (Savannah), June 5, 1868, at 2, col. 1.
14. Speech of Benjamin H. Hill in Atlanta, March 10, 1868, in DAILY NEW ERA (Atlanta),
Mar. 13, 1868, at 2, cols. 6-7. After Congress had in fact deleted most of the relief section from
the Georgia constitution, the Milledgeville Federal Union celebrated the fact in a gloating
editorial:
This must be humiliating to those white men who voted for the whole catalogue of
abominations called a Constitution, for the sake of avoiding the payment of their hon-
est debts. They literally sold their birthright for a mess of pottage, and now they will be
cheated out of their pottage. Well, they have nobody to blame but themselves. We told
you how it would be. We told you over and over again that the Radicals in Congress
could not and dare not sanction repudiation.
FEDERAL UNION (Milledgeville, Georgia), June 9, 1868, at 2, col. 1.
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not compel any State to form Courts with jurisdiction to enforce
contracts.15
The Reconstruction Act required that the new constitutions be
ratified by referendum in each state, then submitted to Congress for
approval. Alone among the proposed constitutions, Georgia's at-
tracted unfavorable attention and revision at the hands of Congress.
The troublesome provision, not surprisingly, was the aggressive treat-
ment of debt relief. Debate over Georgia's relief provisions obliged
Congress to pay some glancing attention to the question of slave con-
tracts, but the references to the subject in the Congressional Globe are
just enough to make it plain that Congress was not deeply interested.
The "Omnibus Bill" for the readmission of North Carolina, South
Carolina, Louisiana, Georgia, and Alabama under their newly framed
constitutions came before the House in mid-May, during the last days
of the presidential impeachment trial in the Senate. Thaddeus Ste-
vens of Pennsylvania promptly offered "an amendment to the consti-
tution of Georgia" to limit the effect of the relief provisions:
And be it further enacted, That the provisions of section seven-
teen, article five of the constitution of Georgia shall not apply to a
debt due to any person who, during the whole time of the rebellion,
was loyal to the United States and opposed to secession.16
Stevens was receiving letters from unhappy creditors in Georgia, urg-
ing him not to approve the constitution with debt relief intact: his cor-
respondents assured him that Georgia's creditors were predominantly
loyal men, while her debtors were overwhelmingly rebels.17 Stevens's
15. Speech of Joseph E. Brown at Marietta, Georgia (Mar. 18, 1868), in DAILY NEW ERA
(Atlanta), Mar. 24, 1868, at 2, cols. 2-3. Other proponents of relief refused to be detained by
such legalisms. "Shall we heed their cry of unconstitutional," demanded W. L. Goodwin,
when any relief measure is offered for their consideration? No, never, never will I
shape my course in this matter to suit the wishes of a few avaricious money thirsty
individuals, who, without the slightest remorse of conscience, would willingly see every
debtor of our State hurled down into the dark, yawning abyss of financial ruin, lost
beyond the possibility of redemption; with his family beggard and set adrift on the
charities of this cold, bleak world.
DAILY NEw ERA (Atlanta), Feb. 2, 1868, at 2, col. 6.
16. CONG. GLOBE, 40th Cong., 2d Sess. 2445 (May 13, 1868).
17. Three letters to this effect survive from May 1868, though all are dated subsequent to
Stevens's introduction of his amendment. B. M. Long & J. W. Stewart to Stevens & W. D. Kelly
[William D. Kelley of Pennsylvania] (May 15, 1868); E. H. L Keister to Stevens (May 18, 1868);
Jno. McK. Gunn to Stevens (May 26, 1868); all in Stevens Papers, Library of Congress. Long
and Stewart, of Carrollton, Georgia, explained the preponderance of loyal creditors by the fact
that:
Such men and only such refused Confederate currency for debts contracted before the
war and because of their opposition to secession and refusing to receive Confederate
currency many were forced to leave their homes or be insulted and in danger of mobs-
We claim to have been of this number. But now when repudiation is inserted in the
constitution of our state in order to catch secession votes and almost every other ques-
tion is lost sight of with the white voters- the argument used for ratification and repu-
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amendment-exempting loyal creditors from Georgia's debt relief-
was actually passed by the House, notwithstanding its evident diffi-
culty of application. By the first week in June, however, when the
Omnibus Bill was introduced in the Senate, the Republican Conven-
tion in Chicago had adopted a platform denouncing "all forms of re-
pudiation as a national crime."'1 8 Georgians were not the only
observers to see a contradiction between the Republican platform and
the Republican program of relief for Georgia.19 The Senate Judiciary
Committee thought it advisable to delete the whole of Georgia's debt
relief section, leaving only the proviso applying to debts contracted for
the sale or hire of slaves.2 The Omnibus Bill was amended accord-
ingly, and Georgia's 1868 constitution received its final form-in
which only slave debts were nullified-at the hands of the United
States Congress.
The Republican leadership in the Senate took the position that
Georgia's relief clause was "palpably unconstitutional," being a direct
impairment of the obligation of contracts.21 But what then of the pro-
viso left standing in Georgia-and the parallel provisions in the con-
stitutions of four other states-barring enforcement of debts for
slaves? The question was briefly addressed. One Republican senator,
George Williams of Oregon, asked why the extinction of debts for
slaves was any less an impairment of contract than the rest of the
clause. George Edmunds of Vermont replied simply that "There we
stand on the higher law." Williams persisted: "If the contract was
legal and valid at the time it was made, and the proviso undertakes to
abolish the contract, does it not impair its obligation?" Oliver P. Mor-
ton, former Republican governor of Indiana, offered an answer that
seems to have satisfied most of the members:
diation was, "That the Patriots during the war took confederate money and only Tories
would lose by repudiation."
Stevens Papers, supra.
18. EDWARD MCPHERSON, POLITICAL HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES 364 (1871).
19. See FEDERAL UNION (Milledgeville, Georgia), May 26, 1868, at 2, col. 1 ("They de-
nounced repudiation as a crime. The pivot on which the Georgia Constitution turned was repu-
diation"). Jno. McK. Gunn, proprietor of a collection agency in Cuthbert, Georgia, wrote to
reproach Thaddeus Stevens that "the repudiation clause ... will not seem consistent with the
platform Genl. Grant is nominated on." Gunn to Stevens, supra note 17. During debate on the
clause in the Senate, Oliver P. Morton of Indiana said of Georgia's attempt at relief that "dis-
guise this as we will, it is simply repudiation. . . . [W]e cannot and dare not give it our
indorsement .... I ask how the Republican party, the party of good faith, would be paralyzed if
it should dare to justify the State of Georgia in repudiating honest debts ...." CONG. GLOBE,
40th Cong., 2d Sess. 2970 (June 9, 1868).
20. CONG. GLOBE, 40th Cong., 2d Sess. 2858-59 (June 5, 1868).
21. Id. at 2969 (June 9, 1868) (Lyman Trumbull of Illinois).
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I am not disposed to argue the question in regard to slave property.
It may, in one sense, impair the obligation. I mean to say, however,
that contracts of that kind are held . . . to stand upon a different
obligation, a different footing morally, and perhaps legally, from
contracts of any other kind. Slave property was swept away; those
owning slaves lost them; and it was perhaps just as proper that those
owning choses in action, debts, promissory notes, and bills of ex-
change given for slaves should lose them, also.22
These-as we shall see-were standard arguments on the merits of
enforcement, not on the constitutionality of a legislative prohibition.
Congress was evidently prepared to leave the latter question to the
courts.
The judicial response was clear. State supreme courts in four of
the six states that attempted to prohibit the enforcement of slave con-
tracts found such measures unconstitutional. 23 The supreme court of
Louisiana declined to rule on the constitutionality of that state's con-
stitutional prohibition: slave contracts were already unenforceable in
Louisiana as a matter of contract law, so that a constitutional provi-
sion to the same effect was superfluous. 24 Only the Georgia Supreme
Court-where the champion of repudiation, former governor Joseph
E. Brown, now sat as Chief Justice-held that a constitutional provi-
sion nullifying slave debts might escape the prohibition of the federal
contracts clause.25 During the ratification campaign of 1868, Brown
had argued that a state did not impair the obligation of contracts if it
simply failed to create courts with jurisdiction to enforce them.26 In
Shorter v. Cobb, Brown stressed a different argument: that Georgia's
nullification of obligations for slaves (assuming it impaired them) was
outside the reach of the federal contracts clause. When Georgia
adopted her 1868 constitution, Georgia had been out of the Union
and was therefore not subject to the constitutional limitations on
"states." Moreover, Georgia's 1868 constitution had been "dictated
by Congress, as the representative of the conqueror"; it was "sanc-
tioned" by Congress with the slave proviso intact; and Congress was
free, as the states were not, to impair the obligation of contracts as it
chose.27
22. Id. at 2999, 3005 (June 10, 1868).
23. For the disposition of this question in Alabama, Arkansas, Florida, and South Carolina,
see infra app. pp. 533-37.
24. Dranguet v. Rost, 21 La. Ann. 538 (1869).
25. Shorter v. Cobb, 39 Ga. 285 (1869).
26. See supra text accompanying note 15.
27. Shorter, 39 Ga. at 287-94, 303-04.
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A different and possibly more attractive argument for the consti-
tutionality of the state prohibitions appears in the one federal case
refusing to enforce a debt for the purchase of slaves. The circuit court
opinion in Osborn v. Nicholson28 relied primarily on natural law and
public policy in denying enforcement, but it found further authority in
the provision of the Arkansas Constitution declaring such contracts
"null and void." Defending the legitimacy of state prohibition under
the federal contracts clause, Judge Henry C. Caldwel 29 suggested that
the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution had
necessarily qualified the contracts clause insofar as the latter pro-
tected contracts whose execution presumed the existence of slavery.
Assume a debt, said Caldwell, secured by a mortgage on slaves; or a
contract for the sale of slaves at a future date; or a note, payable in
slaves. The obligation of contracts in all these cases is obviously im-
paired by emancipation, yet we would not think for that reason that
provisions of state constitutions declaring the abolition of slavery were
void under the contracts clause. 30 The weakness of Caldwell's analo-
gies is evident: where creditors sought the payment of a money obliga-
tion, contractual performance was not dependent on the continued
existence of slavery. The Thirteenth Amendment could have no bear-
ing on the question unless the enforcement of a slave debt somehow
implied the permanence of the institution. In the eyes of some ob-
servers, however, this is precisely what it did.
The different strands of the slave-contract problem, complicated
by some knotty issues of federal jurisdiction, came together in a quin-
tet of cases decided by the United States Supreme Court, in opinions
by Justice Noah Swayne of Ohio, in April 1872.
The first three decisions, announced together on April 1, 1872,
turned on the limits of federal jurisdiction to review state court judg-
ments. Palmer v. Marston31 was a case in which the Louisiana
Supreme Court, consistent with its prior course of decision, had re-
fused to enforce a promissory note given for a slave. Counsel for the
creditor had argued that the slave-contract provision of Louisiana's
1868 constitution was in violation of the federal Constitution. The
28. 18 F. Cas. 846 (C.C.E.D. Ark. 1870) (No. 10,595), rev'd, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 654 (1872).
29. Caldwell, a young lawyer and state legislator from Iowa, commanded an Iowa cavalry
regiment at the capture of Little Rock in September 1863. In June 1864, while Caldwell was
serving with his regiment in Tennessee, he was appointed federal district judge for the District of
Arkansas by President Lincoln. See 1 JOHN HALLUM, BIOGRAPHICAL AND PICTORIAL HISTORY
OF ARKANSAS 481-88 (1887).
30. Osborn, 18 F. Cas. at 853-54.
31. 81 U.S. (14 Wall.) 10 (1872).
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Louisiana court held to its earlier position: while the federal contracts-
clause issue might "possess considerable speculative interest," it could
not "have a practical influence on the result," inasmuch as the state
constitutional prohibition was specifically disavowed as the basis of
decision.32 The Supreme Court agreed. Because the Louisiana court
had based its judgment on "the settled principles of the jurisprudence
of the State," and not on any statutory or constitutional enactment
that might be found to conflict with the federal Constitution, the state
court judgment presented no question susceptible of Supreme Court
review. The creditor's writ of error was dismissed for want of
jurisdiction. 33
In Jacoway v. Denton 34 and Sevier v. Haskell,35 two cases from
Arkansas, the state supreme court had held slave debts enforceable on
common-law grounds. In both cases, moreover, the state court had
considered the effect of Arkansas's 1868 constitution, which declared
slave contracts (and judgments thereon) null and void, holding this
provision of the new state constitution invalid under the federal con-
tracts clause. 36 The only question in either case that could have been
the basis of federal review was thus the correctness of Arkansas's
holding that Arkansas's constitutional provision violated the federal
Constitution. But the Judiciary Act of 1789, as amended in 1867, still
restricted federal jurisdiction to review state court judgments, in cases
of alleged conflict between state and federal laws, to judgments in
which the state court had upheld the validity of the state law. 37 In
32. The relevant portion of the Louisiana opinion, which does not appear in the Louisiana
Annual Reports, is set forth in the Supreme Court's opinion. Id. at 11-12.
33. Id. at 12. The disposition of Palmer v. Marston is fully intelligible only when it is re-
called that, by the settled interpretation of the contracts clause, only the enacted law of a state-
as opposed to the decisional law made by its judges-was considered to fall within the prohibi-
tion of article I, section 10, forbidding a state to "pass any ... Law impairing the Obligation of
Contracts." U.S. CONST. art. I § 10. Were it otherwise,
every case of a contract held by the state court not to be binding, for any cause
whatever, [could] ... be brought to this court for review, and we should thus become
the court of final resort in all cases of contract where the decisions of state courts were
against the validity of the contracts ....
This, obviously, was not the purpose of the judiciary act. It must be the Constitu-
tion, or some law of the state, which impairs the obligation of the contract ... and the
decision of the state court must sustain the law or Constitution of the state in the mat-
ter in which the conflict is supposed to exist, or the case for this court does not arise.
Mississippi & M. R.R. v. Rock, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 177, 181 (1867) (Miller, J.).
34. 154 U.S. 583 (1872).
35. 81 U.S. (14 Wall.) 12 (1872).
36. Haskill v. Sevier, 25 Ark. 152 (1867), affd, 26 Ark. 133 (1870), error dismissed, 81 U.S.
(14 Wall.) 12 (1872); Jacoway v. Denton, 25 Ark. 625 (1869).
37. Act of Feb. 5, 1867, ch. 28, § 2, 14 Stat. 385, 386.
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Jacoway and Sevier, the situation was the reverse. The Supreme Court
dismissed the writs of error in both cases for want of jurisdiction.
Three weeks later, on April 22, 1872, the Court finally took up
the dual controversy on the merits. White v. Hart,38 the case in which
the Supreme Court addressed the constitutional issue, had been a
companion to Shorter v. Cobb,39 in which the Georgia Supreme Court
refused to enforce a debt for slaves on the authority of the slave-con-
tract proviso in Georgia's 1868 constitution and denied that the consti-
tutional prohibition violated the federal contracts clause. No counsel
for the debtor appeared in the Supreme Court, "the reliance of that
party apparently having been on the argument contained in the opin-
ion given by Brown, C.J., in behalf of the Supreme Court of Geor-
gia." 40 Brown's arguments were now briskly rejected. Georgia had
never been out of the Union. (This was something of an oversimplifi-
cation, but it was an oversimplification the Court had recently agreed
to adopt.41) More to the point, it would not do to admit that Georgia,
"after her rebellion and before her representation was restored," had
any more power "to grant a title of nobility, to pass a bill of attainder,
an ex post facto law, or law impairing the obligation of contracts, or to
do anything else prohibited to her by the Constitution of the United
States, than she had before her rebellion began, or after her restora-
tion to her normal position in this Union. '42 The contention that
Georgia's constitution "was adopted under the dictation and coercion
of Congress, and is the act of Congress, rather than of the State" was
"clearly unsound. '43 Nor could Georgia maintain that in denying ju-
risdiction to enforce a class of contracts there was no impairment of
the obligation. "When the contract here in question was entered into,
ample remedies existed. All were taken away by the proviso in the
new constitution. Not a vestige was left. Every means of enforcement
was denied, and this denial if valid involved the annihilation of the
contract." 4 The states could not, consistent with the contracts clause,
prohibit the enforcement of debts for slaves.
Finally, Osborn v. Nicholson45 presented the enforcement ques-
tion stripped of the constitutional issue, as a matter of federal com-
38. 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 646 (1872), rev'g 39 Ga. 306 (1869).
39. Shorter v. Cobb, 39 Ga. 285 (1869).
40. White, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) at 647 (reporter's note).
41. See Texas v. White, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 700 (1869).
42. White, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) at 652.
43. Id. at 649.
44. Id. at 654.
45. 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 654 (1872).
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mon law. Judge Caldwell of the Eastern District of Arkansas had held
slave contracts unenforceable, emphasizing arguments drawn from
natural law, public policy, and the perceived implications of the Thir-
teenth and Fourteenth Amendments.46 Reversing the decision of the
lower court, Justice Swayne brought federal common law on this point
into accord with the laws of every state except Louisiana. The con-
tract in question, he noted, had been valid when made; with the pas-
sage of title to the property, the buyer had assumed the risk of loss
from whatever source; observations about the natural law of slavery
and freedom did not alter the fact that slavery had existed among us
by positive law. "We cannot regard ... [the contract] as differing in its
legal efficacy from any other unexecuted contract to pay money made
upon a sufficient consideration at the same time and place," wrote
Swayne. "Neither the rights nor the interests of those of the colored
race lately in bondage are affected by the conclusions we have
reached. '47 As a practical matter, the controversy over slave con-
tracts was essentially over.
Only Chief Justice Salmon P. Chase-whose work in the antislav-
ery cause during the 1840s had earned him the title "Attorney Gen-
eral for Fugitive Slaves"48-dissented from the decisions in White v.
Hart and Osborn v. Nicholson. Chase's declining health left him with-
out the strength to argue, and he appended to Swayne's opinion the
mere outline of an abolitionist dissent:
The CHIEF JUSTICE dissented in this case and in the preced-
ing one of White v. Hart, on the grounds:
1st. That contracts for the purchase and sale of slaves were and
are against sound morals and natural justice, and without support
except in positive law.
2d. That the laws of the several States by which alone slavery
and slave contracts could be supported, were annulled by the thir-
teenth amendment of the Constitution which abolished slavery.
3d. That thenceforward the common law of all the States was
restored to its original principles of liberty, justice, and right, in con-
formity with which some of the highest courts of the late Slave
States, notably that of Louisiana, have decided, and all might, on
the same principles, decide, slave contracts to be invalid, as inconsis-
tent with their jurisprudence, and this court has properly refused to
interfere with those decisions.
46. 18 F. Cas. 846 (C.C.E.D. Ark. 1870) (No. 10,595). See supra text accompanying note 30.
47. Osborn, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) at 663.
48. PAUL FINKELMAN, AN IMPERFECT UNION: SLAVERY, FEDERALISM, AND COMITY 157
(1981). For a discussion on Chase's activities as an abolitionist lawyer in Ohio, see id. at 155-76.
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4th. That the clause in the fourteenth amendment of the Con-
stitution which forbids compensation for slaves emancipated by the
thirteenth, can be vindicated only on these principles.
5th. That clauses in State constitutions, acts of State legisla-
tures, and decisions of State courts, warranted by the thirteenth and
fourteenth amendments, cannot be held void as in violation of the
original Constitution, which forbids the States to pass any law vio-
lating the obligation of contracts. 49
The combination of Palmer v. Marston (allowing Louisiana to im-
pair slave obligations so long as it did so by judicial decision) and
Osborn v. Nicholson (holding such obligations enforceable in the fed-
eral courts) yielded the result, in the era of Swift v. Tyson,50 that a
given promissory note might be null and void in a Louisiana state
court yet fully enforceable in the federal court down the street, if it
were in the hands of an out-of-state resident who could gain access by
diversity of citizenship. When Boyce v. Tabb5l presented precisely
this situation, the Supreme Court affirmed a judgment of the Circuit
Court for the District of Louisiana enforcing a promissory note given
for slaves in 1861. The distasteful possibility that United States courts
might provide a forum in which debts for slaves were still enforced
had led Charles Sumner of Massachusetts, some years earlier, to intro-
duce a bill that would have withdrawn federal jurisdiction to hear this
class of cases.52 Nothing came of the proposal in Congress, but Sum-
ner's initiative won him the praise-as Charles Fairman recounts-of
Gideon J. Pillow, late Brigadier General, C.S.A., who wrote from his
law office in Memphis to explain the urgent need for such protection:
I am myself sued for $150.000 & a Decree was had against me
for it,--on slave contracts,-The suit is now pending in the Supreme
Court of Arkansas .... If not pressed through Congress, your mea-
sure of relief & justice will come too late. There are now in suit in
the Southern States, I should think, not less than 250 million of
these claims.53
49. Osborn, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) at 663-64.
50. 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1, 19 (1842) (Story, J.) (federal "rules of decision" governing "contracts
and other instruments of a commercial nature ... to be sought not in the decisions of the local
tribunals, but in the general principles and doctrines of commercial jurisprudence"), overruled by
Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 79 (1938).
51. 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 546 (1873).
52. S. 254, 41st Cong., 1st Sess. (April 5, 1869). Sumner's bill is set forth in the Appendix.
See infra app. p. 538.
53. Letter from Gideon J. Pillow to Charles Sumner (Apr. 6, 1869), quoted in CHARLES
FAIRMAN, RECONSTRUCION AND REUNION, 1864-88, PART ONE 860 n.289 (1971). The debt to
which Pillow refers originated in a purchase of eighty-five slaves in December 1860 for $109,286;
payment was by promissory notes at one, two, three, and four years' maturities. Pillow v. Brown
& Childress, 26 Ark. 240, 243 (1870). Pillow, owner of "a small empire in eastern Arkansas," is
thought to have been (in 1860) the sixth largest slaveholder in that state; he ranked third among
[Vol. 70:493
1994] ENFORCEABILITY OF SLAVE CONTRACTS AFTER EMANCIPATION 507
The unaccustomed convergence of views between the abolitionist sen-
ator and the former slaveholder reminds us that the idea of refusing to
enforce debts for slaves attracted its various supporters for very differ-
ent reasons.
II. WHAT THEY SAID
The contention that debts for slaves should be unenforceable af-
ter emancipation began as a lawyer's argument on behalf of a debtor
defending a suit on a promissory note. At this first level of debate, the
debtor for slaves offered a defense framed in familiar terms of com-
mercial law: payment was not due because emancipation had brought
about a breach of the seller's warranties and a failure of consideration.
Considered as it was offered-as turning on a question of the law of
sales-such a defense did not deserve to succeed, and it did not. The
argument against enforcement was pursued at a deeper level outside
the courtrooms, particularly in the Reconstruction conventions, where
the nullification of slave debts became a common objective of groups
whose purposes were nearly diametrically opposed.
The starting point of the argument about breach of warranty was
the widespread practice by which a seller of slaves would warrant to
the buyer, in the bill of sale, that the persons being sold were "slaves
for life." Buyers in the post-war cases commonly argued that emanci-
pation resulted in a breach of this warranty. It was reasonably plain,
however, that the "slave for life" warranty was understood in no such
sense. As the Georgia Supreme Court explained in an early decision:
[T]hese words were used to describe the then present status of the
negroes; they were slaves for life in contradistinction to slaves for a
shorter period of time. By the laws of some of the States, slaves
were freed on arriving at certain ages; by the laws of others, free
negroes, for crime, were sold into slavery for certain periods of
time; and this covenant was introduced to guard against frauds in
the sale of such negroes, and all others whose legal status was to be
that of freedom at some future time .... 54
There was no reason why a seller could not, if he chose, offer slaves
with a lifetime guarantee against emancipation. But "if such had been
the intention and understanding of the parties to this contract," ob-
served the Florida Supreme Court, "they would doubtless have been
slaveholders in Tennessee. By March 1863, with his property in both states under Union occupa-
tion, Pillow estimated that he had lost slaves to the value of more than $1 million. NATHANIEL
CHEAIRS HUGHES, JR. & Roy P. STONESn'ER, JR., THE LIFE AND WARS OF GIDEON J. PILLOW
142-43, 246 (1993).
54. Hand v. Armstrong, 34 Ga. 232, 238 (1866).
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more explicit in making known that intention than by adopting a
stereotyped formula, which had been in use under an entirely differ-
ent condition of things for more than two hundred years."'55
A second version of the argument, that emancipation caused a
breach of the seller's warranty of title, was likewise unavailing. As
explained in South Carolina:
The emancipation of slaves by governmental authority was a
possible contingency which must be assumed, from the peculiar
character of the property, to have been understood by the parties
treating for their sale and purchase. A warrantor of title is an in-
surer of it against all lawfully claiming by a better one. Emancipa-
tion, whether the act of the United States or the State, does not
change the title by vesting it in another, but, in effect, declares that
those on whom it operated shall not be the subject of property.56
Alternatively, if there was a sense in which emancipation resembled a
loss of property by the assertion of paramount title, the proper anal-
ogy was to eminent domain, which had never been held to constitute a
breach of the vendor's warranty. When the issue of slave contracts
came before the United States Supreme Court in Osborn v.
Nicholson, the majority found the cases on warranty and eminent do-
main "strikingly apposite" to the point under consideration:
As regards the principle involved we see nothing to distinguish
those cases from the one before us. In all of them the property was
lost to the owner by the paramount act of the State, which neither
party anticipated, and in regard to which the contract was silent.
Emancipation and the eminent domain work the same result as re-
gards the title and possession of the owner .... Why should the
seller be liable in one case and not in the other? We can see no
foundation, in reason or principle, for such a claim.57
Buyers sometimes complained that emancipation brought about a
"failure of consideration" justifying their refusal to pay.58 The Ala-
bama ordinance, copied by the Florida constitution, employed this
language to explain the nullification of slave contracts. 59 But the ex-
pression "failure of consideration," used by a buyer of slaves, was
merely a professional-sounding way of referring to the fact that the
buyer had subsequently lost, without compensation, the "considera-
55. Walker v. Gatlin, 12 Fla. 9, 14 (1867). Counsel in a Missouri case argued similarly that
"if any man ever did attempt to warrant that the people would never emancipate the slaves in
this State, he would have required an extra price, and the terms of the warranty would have been
clear and explicit." Phillips v. Evans, 38 Mo. 305, 311 (1866).
56. Calhoun v. Calhoun, 2 S.C. 283, 303 (1870).
57. Osborn v. Nicholson, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 654, 658 (1872).
58. See, e.g., Calhoun, 2 S.C. at 286; Lewis v. Woodfolk, 61 Tenn. 25, 46 (1872).
59. The Alabama ordinance is set forth in the Appendix. See infra app. p. 533.
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tion" he had bargained for. Certainly there was no failure of consider-
ation in a technical sense.60 Buyers in the cases that concern us had
already obtained full performance from sellers; their complaint was
that their enjoyment of the property purchased was cut short by a
supervening casualty.
But if slaves were like other property-the assumption on which
this branch of the argument proceeded-then the allocation of the
risk of loss by supervening casualty or eminent domain was a question
as clearly and firmly settled as any in the law. The risk of loss fol-
lowed the title, whether to land or to chattels; its incidence was
governed by the maxim res perit domino, shorthand for the straight-
forward proposition that loss to property is for the account of the
owner. The point of the maxim is at its sharpest when the supervening
casualty arrives, not as a bolt from the blue, but as the realization of a
risk with reference to which the parties must be deemed to have
contracted.
Throughout the opinions that enforced slave contracts if valid
when made, no theme appears more consistently or forcefully than the
idea that justice between buyer and seller requires that the buyer bear
the risk of loss once ownership has been transferred. 61 Such is the
60. "Failure of consideration" describes circumstances in which a buyer does not receive the
seller's promised performance. Examples in this context would include the purported sale of a
"slave" after the effective date of emancipation; or the sale of a slave intended to take effect in
the future, the slave being emancipated before title has passed. Cases involving slave contracts
made after the Emancipation Proclamation (Jan. 1, 1863) often turned on an argument about the
date at which slavery was in fact abolished at a particular locale: the usual view was that legal
emancipation advanced pari passu with the military authority to enforce it, or else that it took
place when decreed by state convention. See, e.g., Dorris v. Grace, 24 Ark. 326 (1866); Haslett v.
Harris, 36 Ga. 632 (1867); The Emancipation Proclamation Cases (Hall v. Keese), 31 Tex. 504
(1868); Henderlite v. Thurman, 63 Va. (22 Gratt.) 466 (1872). The possibility of a failure of
consideration where emancipation intervenes to foreclose passage of title under a valid execu-
tory contract is discussed in Atkins v. Busby, 25 Ark. 176 (1867), and Bradford v. Jenkins, 41
Miss. 328 (1867).
61. Decisions emphasizing the point, in addition to those quoted in the text, include: Os-
born v. Nicholson, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 654, 659-60 (1872); Jacoway v. Denton, 25 Ark. 625, 628
(1869); Hand v. Armstrong, 34 Ga. 232, 237 (1866) ("The negroes belonged to Hand, not to
Armstrong, and why then should Armstrong make good the losses of Hand?"); Bradford, 41
Miss. at 336; Curd v. Bonner, 44 Tenn. (4 Cold.) 632, 641-42 (1867) ("Individual hardships result,
but they must be borne, as other great public calamities, by those upon whom they fall.").
Pertinent English authority-arising out of the abolition of slavery a generation earlier in
the West Indies-supported the view that the loss of slaves by emancipation was for the account
of the owner. British abolition left former slaves in a state of mandatory "apprenticeship" to
their former owners for a term of years. A former slaveholder in British Guiana sold "all his
right, title and interest in and to the services and labour of 153 apprenticed labourers formerly
slaves" for the sum of £7800, payable in six annual installments of £1300. Four payments had
been made when the colonial authorities abolished the status of "apprenticeship," thereby com-
pleting the emancipation of the former slaves. The buyer's obligation to pay the balance of the
price was held not to be discharged:
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unquestioned rule where loss to property is caused by unforeseeable
casualty. A seller of real estate who warrants title and "quiet enjoy-
ment" is not responsible to the buyer, noted the Missouri court,
should the property be swallowed up and destroyed by an earth-
quake .... We are unable to distinguish the case supposed from the
one presented here at bar. The Ordinance of Emancipation caused
a complete annihilation or destruction of all property in slaves. It
could not be controlled by the parties, nor was it contemplated by
them.62
On the alternative view, no doubt more realistic, that the risk of de-
struction of slave property is necessarily contemplated by both buyers
and sellers, the propriety of the rule appears a fortiori. "The emanci-
pation of slaves by governmental authority," observed Chief Justice
Moses of South Carolina, "was a possible contingency which must be
assumed, from the peculiar character of the property, to have been
understood by the parties treating for their sale and purchase. '63 The
Virginia court made the point more elaborately:
The parties knew that the slaves were perishable, and that some or
all of them might, at any time, die or run away, or otherwise cease
to be slaves.... That some of them might run away, and thus be-
come free, was not at all improbable. They lived on the Potomac
river, near the border of the free States, where the facilities of es-
cape were very great and often made available for that purpose. It
was possible, though not so probable, that the slaves might all be
swept off by cholera or other epidemic, or might cease to be slaves
by the effects of war or the action of the government. The property,
in its nature, was subject to many and eculiar perils. But all these
perils were known to the parties ....
And the perils, being known, were inevitably reflected in the price.
"It is well known that the value of slaves, at different times, was
greatly affected by the political aspect of the country," wrote a South
Carolina judge in 1866. "And I think it may be safely taken for
granted that, when the intestate made the purchase, he took the
chances of emancipation into consideration, and paid such a price as
[Tihe whole question is, who shall bear the loss occasioned by a vis major.... The
property in the services of these labourers had been transferred to the defendant. Then
the question is analogous to those which often arise in cases of loss by fire; as, whether
the goods were destroyed were in transitu or the transit was ended. If the property
here had passed, and the residue of it was destroyed by a vis major, the loss must fall
upon the proprietor of the thing, namely, of the services during the unexpired term.
Mittelholzer v. Fullarton, 6 Q.B. 989, 1020, 115 Eng. Rep. 373, 385 (1844), affd per curiam, 6
Q.B. 1022, 115 Eng. Rep. 385 (Exch. Ch. 1845). The English decision is treated as authoritative
in several of the American cases. See, e.g., The Emancipation Proclamation Cases (Hall v.
Keese), 31 Tex. 504, 528-29 (1868); Osborn, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 654.
62. Phillips v. Evans, 38 Mo. 305, 314 (1866).
63. Calhoun v. Calhoun, 2 S.C. 283, 303 (1873).
64. Scott's Ex'x v. Scott, 59 Va. (18 Gratt.) 150, 176 (1868).
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he supposed the intrinsic value of the slaves, lessened by such chances,
would justify him in doing." 65 The available evidence on slave prices,
which underwent a sharp decline from historic high levels as the Civil
War came finally into prospect, fully supports the judge's conjecture. 66
More generally, of course, every contract for the sale of goods of fluc-
tuating value reflects the parties' differing assessments of future con-
tingencies: a primary function of contract law is to allow individuals to
act on these assessments. The only peculiarity of the slave contracts in
this regard lay in the nature of the contingency that the parties' bar-
gain inevitably appraised.
Commercial-law arguments based on "breach of warranty" and
"failure of consideration" faced a second obstacle, equally as imposing
as the settled authorities on risk of loss. Defendants in the slave-con-
tract cases had given promissory notes for the purchase of slaves: the
transactions remained executory in that the price had not yet been
paid. But if these debtors could make out a defense in terms of war-
ranty or "failure of consideration," it was impossible to explain why a
cause of action in similar terms should not arise in favor of all purchas-
ers of slaves, whatever the date of the transaction, with respect to any
slaves subsequently lost to emancipation. A warranty accompanying
the sale of a slave would not lose its potency because the price was
paid in cash, or because promissory notes had already been redeemed.
Decisions enforcing debts for slaves frequently referred to this unac-
ceptable consequence of a contrary holding.67 The objection went un-
answered by debtors and was, in truth, unanswerable.
The unpersuasive character of the commercial-law arguments
against enforceability suggests that the real objections to enforcing
slave contracts lay elsewhere. Louisiana was the one state whose
courts refused to enforce slave contracts as a matter of decisional law.
65. Calhoun v. Calhoun, 2 S.C. 283, 286 (Cir. Ct. 1866).
66. Price quotations from auctioneering and trading firms in the Richmond market, col-
lected by Michael Tadman, show slave prices holding firm, at or near their historic highs, from
January 1859 through the late summer of 1860. The next (and last) available quotation, for
January 1861, reflects a decline of approximately one-third. See MICHAEL TADMAN, SPECULA-
TORS AND SLAVES: MASTERS, TRADERS, AND SLAVES IN THE OLD SouTH 289-91, tbl. A6.3
(1989).
67.
If the warranty of servitude be held to be broken because of the Government act of
emancipation, then every such warranty of servitude of a slave thus emancipated must,
for a like reason, be held to be broken, and a right of action for such breach would exist
from the date of emancipation, although made fifty years ago, for time cannot affect the
principle; nor can the fact as to whether the purchase money was or was not paid.
Haskill v. Sevier, 25 Ark. 152, 157-58 (1867). "If the abolition of slavery could have such an
effect, then all persons who had paid money or property might sue for and recover it back, as
having been paid without consideration." Roundtree v. Baker, 52 II1. 241, 249 (1869).
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In the leading case of Wainwright v. Bridges,68 two opinions for the
majority purport to rely on a theory of warranty.69 But the subse-
quent course of decision indicates that the Louisiana court soon
adopted a more radical view of the question. The note sued upon in
Rodriquez v. Bienvenu70 had been given for the hire of slaves; the
term of hire had been completed, and the services fully performed
under the contract, prior to emancipation and prior to the making of
the note. No argument about warranty or failure of consideration was
possible in such circumstances. The court declared instead that
"[w]ith the end of the status or condition of slavery, every contract
founded upon, or growing out of that condition, necessarily came to
an end also, whether such contract was previously valid or not.''71
This more radical way of putting the matter introduces the more
interesting arguments against enforcing slave contracts, those based
on notions-sometimes dramatically conflicting-of public policy and
natural law. The simplest assertion was that the dignity and policy of
the state required that her courts no longer be open to hear the dis-
putes of slaveowners and their successors in interest. Arguments
framed in terms of commercial law led inexorably to the conclusion
that justice between buyer and seller required that the buyer be held
to his undertaking; better to deny that justice between the buyers and
sellers of slaves could ever again be a concern of the courts. Courts
were not open to resolve the quarrels of horse thieves, or to enforce
"obligations payable to robbers," William J. Whipper declared to the
South Carolina convention; he was "not willing that the machinery of
our Courts should be used for the purpose of wringing the bone from
the two dogs."'72 "Could it have been intended," demanded Judge
Caldwell in Arkansas, "that free citizens should still be the subject
matter of litigation in the courts of justice, as chattels?" Was it possi-
ble "that the courts are still to guard this relic of a condemned system
by adjusting the balance of justice between the buyer and seller under
68. 19 La. Ann. 234 (1867).
69.
True, the vendor complied with his part of the agreement by transfer of the title and
delivery of the slave; but surely the vendee's consent was given under the assurance
that he was to be maintained in the possession of the slave, and to receive his labor and
services during life.
Id. at 239. A concurring opinion noted that the seller "would be entitled to recover if there was
no warranty in the sale." Id. at 240.
70. 22 La. Ann. 300 (1870)
71. Id. at 301.
72. PROCEEDINGS OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF SOUTH CAROLINA 230-32
(1868) [hereinafter SoUTm CAROLINA CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION].
[Vol. 70:493
1994] ENFORCEABILITY OF SLAVE CONTRACTS AFTER EMANCIPATION 513
such painful and exasperating circumstances? ' 73 Denying that such
disputes were any longer cognizable by the courts made a relatively
strong argument against enforcement: it was a position that could be
rejected but not refuted. But this form of the argument was relatively
rare. The "balance of justice between the buyer and seller," and the
terms on which it should be adjusted, were evidently of vital interest
to most participants in the debate. This made it difficult to say that
they were matters beneath judicial notice.
A more frequent argument asserted that courts could no longer
enforce slave contracts-concededly valid when made-because the
destruction of slavery destroyed the legal foundation of the obligation.
This was the reasoning of the Louisiana court in Rodriquez v.
Bienvenu:
The existence of a state of slavery, sanctioned by law, lay at the
foundation of the contract of hire [or purchase] of slaves. The laws,
which authorized and enforced the contract, were necessarily abol-
ished by the subversion of slavery. Persons could no longer be sold
or hired. Existing obligations for the price or the hire could not be
enforced, for there was no longer any law authorizing their
enforcement. 74
A dissenting opinion in the Alabama Supreme Court offered the same
reasoning. "Every contract, to have validity, must be founded upon a
law," proposed Judge Peters. "If the law is taken away the obligation
of the contract is gone."
To say that [slave contracts] were once legal, and therefore remain
legal, is not enough. It must appear that the law upon which they
originally rested; still remains a law .... But nothing of this kind
can be shown. Sublato fundamento cadit opus. Upon the extinction
of the law of slavery these contracts became illegal .... 75
The argument, in fact, is the one we have already observed in the skel-
eton opinion of Chief Justice Chase, dissenting in Osborn v. Nicholson
on the grounds:
1st. That contracts for the purchase and sale of slaves were and
are against sound morals and natural justice, and without support
except in positive law.
73. Osborn v. Nicholson, 18 F. Cas. 846, 855 (C.C.E.D. Ark. 1870), rev'd 80 U.S. (13 Wall.)
654 (1872).
74. 22 La. Ann. at 301-02. Compare Wainwright v. Bridges, 19 La. Ann. 234, 241 (1867)
(Howell, J., concurring) ("Property in slaves being prohibited, all contracts based upon such
property are, necessarily, stricken with nullity.").
75. McElvain v. Mudd, 44 Ala. 48, 75-76 (1870) (citations omitted).
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2d. That the laws of the several States by which alone slavery
and slave contracts could be supported, were annulled by the thir-
teenth amendment of the Constitution which abolished slavery. 76
The point being asserted in these and similar statements was de-
rived, in attenuated form, from Lord Mansfield's famous dictum in
Somerset's Case: that slavery being contrary to the law of nature,
"nothing can be suffered to support it, but positive law."' 77 Positive
law protecting slavery had at last been obliterated by the Thirteenth
Amendment. The institution had fallen; everything that was necessar-
ily based on slavery had necessarily fallen with it. There was undeni-
ably a sense in which outstanding debts for the purchase and hire of
slaves were "based on slavery"-hence the argument that they had
become unenforceable as lacking a legal "foundation." And yet the
continued existence of slavery was in no sense necessary to the en-
forcement of debts for slaves. The legal foundation of the enforce-
ment of a debt, after all, was not the law of slavery but the law of
contracts.
Statements of the kind already quoted, asserting that the aboli-
tion of slavery nullified outstanding debts relating to slaves, depended
on the view that to enforce a debt for a slave was in some sense to
enforce slavery itself. The view was widely held. "Shall we now, after
having succeeded in getting free from this terrible curse, still continue
to recognize its legality in any shape or form?" asked B. 0. Duncan in
the South Carolina convention. "I contend that still to recognize
debts or obligations of any kind for slaves, is still to recognize rights in
slavery."' 78 Addressing the convention shortly after its opening in De-
cember 1868, former South Carolina governor James L. Orr-who
coolly advised the delegates that "the intelligence, refinement and
wealth of the State is not represented by your body"-lectured them
76. 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 654, 663 (1872) (Chase, C.J., dissenting).
77. Somerset v. Stewart, Lofft 1, 19, 98 Eng. Rep. 499, 510 (K.B. 1772). Celebrated Ameri-
can decisions had adopted Mansfield's position: because slavery was a violation of natural law, it
could exist only where established and protected by positive law. See, e.g., United States v. La
Jeime Eugenie, 26 F. Cas. 832 (C.C. Mass. 1822) (No. 15,551) (Story, J.); The Antelope, 23 U.S.
(10 Wheat.) 66 (1825) (Marshall, C.J.); Commonwealth v. Ayes (Med's Case), 35 Mass. (18 Pick.)
193 (1836) (Shaw, C.J.). The common legal shorthand for the rule of Somerset's Case appears in
the remarks by which Oliver P. Morton of Indiana defended the slave-contract proviso to the
Georgia relief clause, during Senate debate:
What is the reason of it? It stands upon the general principle that has been recognized
by the laws of the United States, that slavery does not exist by virtue of national [sic]
law, but only by virtue of positive law, and that slaves are no consideration for a con-
tract except by virtue of positive law; and that when that positive law is withdrawn the
consideration falls to the ground.
CoNo. GLOBE, 40th Cong., 2d Sess. 3005 (June 10, 1868).
78. SoUTH CAROLNA CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION, supra note 72, at 215-16.
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as to the necessity of debt relief generally and the "wiping out" of
slave debts in particular. "If these debts are recognized," advised the
former governor, "it is a recognition of that institution, of its propri-
ety, its justice and morality. '79
In traditional legal contemplation, however, such was demonstra-
bly not the case. Lord Mansfield himself, in another portion of
Somerset's Case, had observed that "[c]ontract for sale of a slave is
good here; the sale is a matter to which the law properly and readily
attaches, and will maintain the price according to the agreement." 80
In his renowned decision in Commonwealth v. Aves, holding slavery
nonexistent under the law of Massachusetts, Chief Justice Lemuel
Shaw described the institution as "contrary to natural right, to the
principles of justice, humanity and sound policy" even as he distin-
guished the enforceability of contracts relating thereto:
So, in pursuance of a well known maxim, that in the construction of
contracts, the lex loci contractus shall govern, if a person, having in
other respects a right to sue in our courts, shall bring an action
against another.., upon a contract made upon the subject of slav-
ery in a state where slavery is allowed by law, the law here would
give it effect. As if a note of hand made in New Orleans were sued
on here, and the defence should be, that it was on a bad considera-
tion, or without consideration, because given for the price of a slave
sold, it may well be admitted, that such a defence could not prevail,
because the contract was a legal one by the law of the place where it
was made.81
All this, to be sure, was prior to the Thirteenth Amendment. But
the commercial rationale of lex loci contractus seemed to extend to the
enforceability of a contract that was legal and enforceable when and
where it was made, notwithstanding an intervening change in the law
of that jurisdiction. (The authority of Mittelholzer v. Fullarton82 was
squarely to this effect.) The claim that the abolition of slavery had
also nullified debts for slaves thus met the judicial rejoinder that a
79. Id. at 47, 51.
80. Lofft at 17, 98 Eng. Rep. at 509. The distinction between the legal impossibility of
slavery under English law, and the enforceability in England of an obligation relating to slaves
located in a jurisdiction where slavery was legal, had been established well before Mansfield. In
Smith v. Brown and Cooper, 2 Salkeld 666, 91 Eng. Rep. 566 (Q.B. 1705), Chief Justice Holt
stated that "as soon as a negro comes into England, he becomes free," while indicating that he
would enforce a debt "for a negro sold here at London" if the declaration averred "that the said
negro at the time of sale was in Virginia, and that negroes, by the laws and statutes of Virginia,
are saleable as chattels." 91 Eng. Rep. at 566-67.
81. 35 Mass. (18 Pick.) 193, 215-16 (1836).
82. 6 Q.B. 989, 1020, 115 Eng. Rep. 373, 385 (1844), affd per curiam, 6 Q.B. 1022, 115 Eng.
Rep. 385 (Exch. Ch. 1845). See supra note 61.
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promissory note was not a "contract for the sale of a slave." Accord-
ing to the Supreme Court of Illinois:
Our courts would not enforce a contract for the sale of a slave,
whether made in this State, where slavery has always been prohib-
ited, or in a State where such contracts are binding, because it is
against public policy. But after the parties have fully executed their
contract, and a note is given for the price, under this comity which
exists between the States of the republic, the note may be collected,
and it is not for us, from caprice, or because we may abhor the sys-
tem of slavery and the sale of human beings, to refuse to lend the
aid of the courts for the collection of the money. It is not against
the policy of our State to allow its collection, nor is it contrary to the
interests of our citizens. Under the laws of Kentucky the sale was
authorized, and there was a sufficient consideration. 83
An Arkansas decision made the point more succinctly:
It is argued that, upon an agreement to perform an act which
becomes unlawful to do, the obligor is excused. Be that true, it is in
no way applicable to the case at bar. Jacoway executed his writing
obligatory, by which he was to pay $4,500 and interest. It is cer-
tainly not unlawful for his representatives to pay off his written obli-
gation, and hence not a parallel case to those cited.84
Such answers may seem lawyerly and literal-minded, oblivious to the
moral issues that many saw in the question. In traditional legal terms,
however-the terms in which the challenge to enforcement was posed
by the arguments considered so far-the judges' response was both
accurate and cogent.
The most interesting and provocative of the arguments raised
against the post-emancipation enforcement of "slave contracts" met
no answer in traditional legal terms, because they had nothing to do
with commercial law. Two very different sorts of considerations led
Reconstruction southerners to common conclusions about debts for
slaves. For some, the overriding issue presented by slave contracts
was the perceived effect of legal enforcement to justify, retrospec-
tively, the institution of slavery that all agreed was gone forever. For
others, the heart of the enforcement question was a matter of equity
toward the former slaveowner. The manifest injustice of emancipa-
tion, in the eyes of the white South, lay in the fact that it took property
without compensation. The national government refused compensa-
tion; the southern states had no compensation to offer; the Fourteenth
Amendment (section 4) now prohibited compensation in any event.
83. Roundtree v. Baker, 52 III. 241, 247 (1869).
84. Jacoway v. Denton, 25 Ark. 625, 636-37 (1869), error dismissed 154 U.S. 583 (1872).
Compare Bradford v. Jenkins, 41 Miss. 328, 336 (1867) ("The contract of the purchaser to pay
the purchase-money has not become one which it is unlawful or impossible for him to perform").
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But by nullifying outstanding debts for slaves, the states might at least
avoid compounding the original injustice: forcing persons already
stripped of property to pay for what had been taken from them. Nul-
lification of slave debts caused that loss to be shared in some rough
measure, affording a partial indemnity to certain former slaveowners
at someone else's expense.
It strained logic to say that the enforcement of a debt for slaves
implied the continuing existence of slavery; it was easy to respond that
the law enforced not slavery, but the debt. The more telling argument
was at first sight the more fanciful one: that to enforce a debt for
slaves was to assert that persons might be chattels. And yet this latter
proposition was in fact irrefutable. That slavery might exist, where
established by positive law; that where it did exist, it formed the basis
of commercial obligations entitled to judicial recognition: these pro-
positions were the undeniable foundation of lex loci contractus, of
Somerset's Case, and of the standard argument for enforceability. But
Lord Mansfield's distinction might be rejected. It had been rejected
by every abolitionist who denied that there ever was or ever could be
"property in man." If positive law is powerless to recognize slavery, it
follows (in any jurisdiction where this truth is acknowledged) that no
sale of slaves was ever legal and valid, and that no debt for slaves was
ever based on good consideration. One of the deeper currents of op-
position to enforcing slave contracts-the neoabolitionist strain-was
thus the continuation of a longstanding argument, the issue being the
legality of slavery in states where slavery is established by law.
An argument that denied the legality of slavery, even where slav-
ery was recognized by positive law, was not an argument for the law
courts. It appears repeatedly and explicitly, by contrast, in the de-
bates of the South Carolina convention, the only one of the Recon-
struction conventions for which we have a record of extended debate
on the "slave contracts" issue. The argument was concisely intro-
duced by Jonathan J. Wright, a black native of Pennsylvania who was
a delegate from Beaufort County.8 5 To show the justice of a measure
prohibiting the enforcement of debts for slaves, Wright suggested, it
was enough to assert "that there never has been, nor never could be,
85. Wright, born near Lancaster, Pennsylvania and educated in Ithaca, New York, became
the first black member of the Pennsylvania bar; in South Carolina after the war he was legal
adviser to the Freedmen's Bureau and the state's first black lawyer. Wright later served in the
state senate (1868-1870), and as associate justice of the supreme court (1870-1877). ERIC FONER,
FREEDOM'S LAWMAKERS: A DIRECTORY OF BLACK OFFICEHOLDERS DURING RECONSTRUC-
TION 236 (1993).
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property in man. Therefore I lay down this proposition, that when-
ever a debt was contracted, the proposed consideration of which was a
slave, there was no consideration received, and where there was no
consideration the debt was null and void." Landon S. Langley, an-
other Beaufort delegate and a mulatto native of Vermont,87 favored
nullification of slave debts so that "it will go forth to the State, and to
the world, as the opinion of this body, as the opinion of the radical
republican party of South Carolina, that there is not, nor cannot be,
any right of property in man.'" Benjamin F. Randolph of
Orangeburg-a mulatto, raised in Ohio89-declared that "we come
here to day to propose that slave debts shall be repudiated. Why?
For no other reason in the world but that we propose to disallow the
principle of the right of property in human flesh."90 Beaufort delegate
William J. Whipper, a mulatto native of Philadelphia, 91 echoed
Wright's demonstration:
If there was the obligation of a contract, there was property in the
thing sold. If there was no property in the thing sold there was no
obligation, and I hold that men cannot be the subject of property by
whatever law you may claim. Just so long then as man is not prop-
erty now, he never was, and hence there never was an obligation.9
The next day, Alonzo J. Ransier, a free mulatto native of Charles-
ton,93 resumed the argument in the abolitionist cadences of a genera-
tion earlier:
86. SOUTH CAROLINA CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION, supra note 72, at 217.
87. FONER, supra note 85, at 127.
88. SOUTH CAROLINA CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION, supra note 72, at 225.
89. Randolph, a graduate of Oberlin College, became a minister and editor in Charleston
where he began an active political career. In 1868 Randolph was chairman of South Carolina's
Republican state committee; represented Orangeburg County in the state senate; and served as
county schools commissioner. He was assassinated by the Ku Klux Klan in October 1868, during
the Republican presidential campaign. FONER, supra note 85, at 175-76.
90. SOUT1 CAROLINA CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION, supra note 72, at 226.
91. Like Wright and Langley-his fellow delegates from Beaufort-Whipper was a mu-
latto, born and educated in the North, who moved to South Carolina after the war, worked for
the Freedmen's Bureau, and practiced law in Beaufort. Whipper studied law in Detroit and
practiced in Ohio before coming South with the Union Army. Later a newspaper publisher and
a planter, Whipper had a long career in Beaufort County politics, holding a variety of offices and
judgeships including three terms in the South Carolina legislature. "Whipper was said to have
lost $75,000 in a night of poker in 1875, including $30,000 on four aces defeated by a straight
flush held by another black legislator." FONER, supra note 85, at 227.
92. SOUTH CAROLINA CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION, supra note 72, at 231 (emphasis
added).
93. Employed as a clerk before the war, Ransier later represented Charleston in the state
legislature (1868-1870). He succeeded Benjamin F. Randolph as Republican state chairman af-
ter Randolph's assassination, see supra note 89, and served as Lieutenant Governor of South
Carolina (1870-1872) and as a member of the 43d Congress (1873-1875). FONER, supra note 85,
at 176-77.
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[A] contract, the proposed consideration of which was based on
man as property, never did have, never can have, any binding force.
It was void of itself; void from the very nature of the case; void
because it was and is violative of the fundamental principle of the
moral law; a principle recognized by the founders of this Govern-
ment, and expressed in unmistakable language in our declaration of
independence; void because it is violative of the natural and inalien-
able right of man to liberty and the pursuit of happiness.94
"If I said these debts should be paid," Ransier concluded, "I recognize
the binding force of a contract that I regard as having no binding
force, and concede that there is such a thing as property in man, which
cannot be." 95 Charleston delegate Gilbert Pillsbury, a white Massa-
chusetts abolitionist (and brother of the antislavery radical Parker
Pillsbury),96 "never supposed that one man could either morally or
legally own another man, as property"; he was naturally ready "to
pronounce against the validity of notes and bonds arising from such
illegal, inhuman traffic."'97
Concluding three days of debate on February 4, 1868, the South
Carolina convention, by a vote of ninety to nineteen, passed an ordi-
nance nullifying contracts for the sale of slaves.98 Slave contracts re-
curred six weeks later as the final substantive business of the
convention, the question this time being whether to repeat the sub-
stance of the ordinance in a constitutional provision. Both William
Whipper and Jonathan Wright switched sides to oppose the measure
in its constitutional form; Wright now expressed the opinion that the
Ordinance violated the federal Constitution. Alonzo Ransier re-
peated his earlier arguments in favor: "Do this, and we emphatically
deny that there ever was or could be property in man." But the most
striking remarks in the brief second round of debate were those of
Robert DeLarge, a Charleston barber who had been born a free mu-
latto in Aiken, South Carolina:99
I am not willing to admit that either myself or my fellow being ever
was property. I am not willing to admit it, and when men who are
94. SOUTH CAROLINA CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION, supra note 72, at 237.
95. Id
96. Richard L. Hume, The "Black and Tan" Constitutional Conventions of 1867-1869 in Ten
Former Confederate States: A Study of Th'eir Membership 465 (1969) (unpublished Ph.D. disser-
tation, University of Washington); JAMEs M. McPHERSON, THE STRUGGLE FOR EQUALITY 379
(1964).
97. SOUTH CAROLINA CoNsTrIrIONAL CONVENTION, supra note 72, at 248.
98. Id. at 248-49 (tally of vote, text of ordinance).
99. DeLarge was "the son of a slaveholding free black tailor and a mother of Haitian ances-
try." He served in the South Carolina House of Representatives (1868-1870), as head of the
state land commission, and as a member of the 42d Congress (1871-1873). FONER, supra note 85,
at 61.
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identified with the race to which I belong, who have felt the heel of
oppression, rise, and by their voice or action, acknowledge that they
or their fellow-men were property, it stings me to the heart. They
should blush to acknowledge it.... Let us, by our votes, deny that
any human being was ever a chattel or a slave. 100
From denying that there ever could be property in man-even where
slavery was recognized by law-it was a short step, indeed, to denying
that anyone had ever been a slave.
By the same reasoning, of course, a slaveowner could have no
claim to compensation for emancipated slaves: what he claimed to
have lost was not legally property and never could have been. But it
was the contrary viewpoint, in which the slaveowner appeared to be
the victim of an uncompensated taking, that gave rise to the second
principal current of opposition to enforcement of debts for slaves.
Nullification measures enjoyed such broad appeal in the constitutional
conventions because they promised partial justice for the former
slaveowner even as they advanced a neoabolitionist argument about
the retrospective illegality of slavery.
The argument in the courts was that the state could not equitably
compel a defendant to pay for what the state had, without compensa-
tion, taken from him. In the words of counsel for a Louisiana debtor:
Not a soul of us would wish to be forced to pay for what had
been taken from him against his will.
And it cannot be our intention, as a sovereign, to wrest a negro
or any other property from a citizen, and then compel him to pay
for the same. Such conduct would do for robbers .... 101
The same argument for the defendant is discernible in other cases, as
when the Virginia Court of Appeals notes that "[tihe gross injustice of
the government, in requiring the citizen to pay for property wrested
from him by the sovereign power, has been strongly pressed upon our
consideration." 10 2 The argument normally foundered, as we have
seen, on the analogy of loss by emancipation to loss by other super-
vening casualty, like cholera or earthquake. But it was enthusiasti-
cally adopted by ex-governor Joseph E. Brown, now Chief Justice of
100. SOUTH CAROLINA CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION, supra note 72, at 914-15 (emphasis
added).
101. Austin v. Sandel, 19 La. Ann. 309, 311 (1867) (brief of counsel).
102. Henderlite v. Thurman, 63 Va. (22 Gratt.) 466, 478 (1872). See also McNealy v. Greg-
ory, 13 Fla. 417, 431 (1870) (if state "has the right to destroy and take away, without compensa-
tion, one kind of property from the people, it surely has the right to take away other kinds");
Hand v. Armstrong, 34 Ga. 232,237 (1866) ("wrong to compel Hand to pay Armstrong for these
negroes, after they have been taken from him by action of the Government").
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the Georgia Supreme Court, in explaining why notes for slaves had
been rendered unenforceable:
Upon what principle of justice or equity can the Government
enforce the payment of all notes given for slaves, in the hands of
vendors, when the slaves for whom they were given... were eman-
cipated by the Government in the hands of the vendees, without
compensation, and in many cases without any pretence of fault on
their part? What solid distinction in principle can be drawn be-
tween the right of property in a slave, and the right of property in a
note given for the same slave? 10 3
Brown had been one of the principal architects of the relief provisions
of Georgia's 1868 constitution; his statements at the time suggest the
extent to which the case for debt relief was associated-for popular
consumption, at least-with the lingering injustice of uncompensated
emancipation. "[T]he property in the hands of debtors, with which
they expected to make payment, has been destroyed by the Govern-
ment," wrote Brown:
Had not their property been destroyed by the government, they
would have made payment, and had ample means left. The war, for
which they were no more responsible than the creditors, has caused
the Government to destroy their property without compensation.
In such a state of things, I hold that it is right that the loss be divided
between debtor and creditor .... 104
In all the Reconstruction conventions, as already noted, the issue
of enforcing slave contracts was treated as a subdivision of the
broader issue of debt relief. Proposals to erase slave debts might be
referred to, and were plainly understood, as measures "for the relief
of purchasers of slaves.'U0 5 A resolution offered in the Virginia con-
vention by George Teamoh-himself a former slave' 06-made the
reasoning explicit: "Resolved, That all debts contracted, and obliga-
tions incurred, by the purchase or sale of slaves since January 1st,
1860, be declared null and void, in view of the fact that no just remu-
neration was received for the obligation or debts thus incurred."' 0 7
103. Shorter v. Cobb, 39 Ga. 285, 297-98 (1869).
104. Letter from Brown to the Hon. J. R. Parrott, president of the Georgia convention (Dec.
10, 1867), DAILY INTELLIGENCER (Atlanta), Dec. 13, 1867, at 2, col. 4.
105. GEORGIA CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION, supra note 7, at 94 (Jan. 9, 1868).
106. Teamoh, a mulatto delegate from Portsmouth, had been born a slave in 1818 but (fol-
lowing his parents' death) was raised by his owners with their own children. He "hired his own
time" as a caulker and carpenter in the Portsmouth shipyards, then escaped from slavery when
his owners hired him out as carpenter on a ship bound for Bremen and New York. Returning to
Portsmouth after the Civil War, Teamoh employed his talent for public speaking as a Union
League organizer; he served in the state senate from 1869 to 1871, and "worked as a caulker to
the end of his life" in 1883. FONER, supra note 85, at 209-10.
107. VIRGINIA CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION, supra note 11, at 98 (Dec. 14, 1867).
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The neoabolitionist position, which maintained that the seller of
slaves had no property to convey, readily accommodated the view that
the buyer of slaves had received no property for which he ought to be
made to pay. Black delegates to the South Carolina convention some-
times adopted the arguments of the plantation owners. Thus Robert
G. DeLarge, the Charleston barber, told the convention that "it would
be unjust to require a purchaser to pay for so-called property, taken
from him by the Act of the State without any compensation."'108 Ver-
mont native Landon S. Langley explicitly accepted the parallel be-
tween compensation and liability:
I hold all law founded in justice, and if it is right for individuals to
pay for slaves, it is right for the Government to pay for them. To be
consistent, therefore, if I were to give my vote in this body against
the [slave contract] Ordinance we are considering, I would also raise
my voice in favor of the Government of the United States paying
for every slave emancipated by virtue of the laws of the United
States.109
Neither the former Confederate governor Joseph E. Brown of Geor-
gia, nor even a wealthy rebel like General Gideon J. Pillow of Tennes-
see, would have put the matter any differently.
III. WHAT THEY THOUGHT THEY WERE DOING
On the neoabolitionist side, the motives for opposing the enforce-
ment of debts for slaves are already complex but not overly difficult to
discern. To men like Charles Sumner (who would have stripped the
federal courts of jurisdiction to hear such cases) and the northern-
born black delegates in the South Carolina convention, the spectacle
of continued litigation over debts for slaves was a relic of barbarism
and a moral affront: this was reason enough to prohibit it. At a
deeper level, these men saw in the controversy over enforceability an
opportunity to declare a belated victory in an old abolitionist crusade,
an argument over the legal status of slavery. If Mansfield, Story, and
Shaw were all wrong-if slavery was a violation of natural law so
profound as to be incapable of legal existence-it followed that debts
for slaves had never been enforceable in the courts of civilized na-
tions, no matter where they were contracted. The Reconstruction
conventions could not, by their action on slave contracts, prove the
point; but by nullifying debts for slaves they could bear tangible wit-
ness to a deeply held belief.
108. SOUTH CAROLINA CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION, supra note 72, at 219-20.
109. Id. at 224.
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The neoabolitionists were not alone either in seeing these impli-
cations of the question or in their willingness to pursue the argument.
The passionate speeches of the South Carolina convention find their
mirror image in an 1872 opinion by Judge Waller R. Staples of the
Virginia Court of Appeals: 110
We are now told that public policy requires the courts to annul any
and every contract entered into during this period, based upon the
sale of property thus recognized and sanctioned for generations by
the sentiments, the laws and the tastes of the people of Virginia.
The proposition involves, in my judgment, an admission derogatory
to our whole previous history.... [We are expected] to surrender
all our previous convictions, to yield our faith and consciences to
the keeping of others, and henceforth to believe that slavery was
wrong in itself-a curse upon our country-a moral leprosy which
corrupted the life-blood of the nation. The proposition now ad-
vanced means this, or it amounts to nothing. If slavery was lawful-
if it was not opposed to good morals and national honor-it is idle
to say that the destruction of the institution can impair or affect
contracts made during the period of its legal and constitutional
existence."'
Motivations on the "reparation" side of the question are, in im-
portant respects, more difficult to ascertain. The nullification of slave
debts offered partial relief to a particular group of relatively wealthy
debtors. That such a result was politically attractive is interesting in
itself. Relief necessarily came at the expense of a particular group of
creditors. Proponents of nullification, like Joseph E. Brown, often
spoke of the justice of causing buyer and seller to share the loss from
emancipation. Refusal to enforce the buyer's promissory note would
result in a sharing of the loss if one or more installments of the price
had already been paid, or if courts allowed sellers to recover for the
hire of slaves for the intermediate period between sale and emancipa-
tion." 2 Frequently, however, the loss to the seller would be total, par-
ticularly where slaves had been sold relatively late in the game. In
110. Staples, a member of the Confederate Congress during the Civil War, was appointed to
Virginia's highest court in 1870, when "the ground-swell of reconstruction had subsided, and
when Virginia was again free to choose her own officers." Henry E. Blair, Waller R. Staples,
Memorial Address Before the Bar of Montgomery County, at Christiansburg (Nov. 26, 1897), in
3 VA. L. REG. 689, 694 (1898).
111. Henderlite v. Thurman, 63 Va. (22 Gratt.) 466, 477 (1872).
112.
A sold B a slave in 1860 for $1,000 and took his note. In 1865 the Government took the
slave from B, and made him free. If A had kept him, the Government would have
done the same. A has lost nothing but the hire of the slave for the time B held him.
The equities of the case require that B pay him hire for the time he used the slave.
Brown to Parrott, Dec. 10, 1867, supra note 104. The slave-contract clauses ultimately enacted in
Georgia and elsewhere made no allowance for a quasi-contractual claim of the kind suggested by
Brown. Judgment by a Louisiana trial court, allowing a seller's claim to the extent of the value
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every case, moreover, the effect of nullification was to reverse-to the
extent of any amount of the price remaining unpaid-the contractual
allocation of risk regarding the future value of slave property that
formed, as we have seen, an unmistakable element of the great major-
ity of the transactions in question. Nullification, in other words,
pushed back the effective date of emancipation as between these buy-
ers and these sellers, denying to the seller the fruit of his favorable
bargain and relieving the buyer from the consequences of his unfavor-
able one.
Who then were the buyers, and who the sellers, that intervention
in this form should have been felt to be just? The beneficiaries of
relief measures in general, and of relief from slave debts in particular,
were both white and relatively well-off. Slaves had incurred no debts.
Nor was debt relief of any particular interest to the poorer whites.
Ratification of Georgia's 1868 constitution was widely attributed to
the political popularity of the relief clause, but the same constitution
guaranteed to each head of a household a homestead-that is, an ex-
emption from attachment for debt-covering real property "to the
value of two thousand dollars, in specie, and personal property to the
value of one thousand dollars in specie, both to be valued at the time
they are set apart." 113 Particularly in view of the depressed property
values prevailing in 1868, a homestead allowance aggregating $3,000
meant that a debtor had to be in fairly comfortable circumstances
before debt relief would avoid the first dollar of obligation he could
be forced to pay. Amos T. Akerman may have exaggerated when he
charged, in the Georgia convention, that the object of relief was "to
uphold a landed aristocracy at the expense of the creditor"; 1 4 but Jno.
McK. Gunn, the Cuthbert, Georgia collection agent, was probably not
far from the mark when he advised Thaddeus Stevens that "the Dr.
class as a class are as able to pay as the Creditor class are to loose."'1 5
Even if wholesale debt relief, as attempted in Georgia, is invaria-
bly a populist program-in that debtors are bound to be both more
numerous and less wealthy than creditors-there are reasons to doubt
that "relief for purchasers of slaves" ought to be so regarded. Persons
indebted for slaves were certainly wealthier than debtors generally, so
long at least as their debts remained unpaid. Simeon Corley, a white
of a slave's services prior to emancipation, was reversed by the Louisiana Supreme Court in Tate
v. Fletcher, 19 La. Ann. 371 (1867).
113. GA. CONST. of 1868, art. VII, § 1.
114. DAILY REPUBLICAN (Savannah), Feb. 7, 1868, at 1, col. 2 (proceedings of Feb. 4, 1868).
115. Gunn to Stevens (May 26, 1868), supra note 17.
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tailor from Lexington, South Carolina who had been "persecuted and
spit upon" for his Unionist views, advised the South Carolina conven-
tion that he would "not consent to relieve this class of creditors; while
my poorer neighbors, whose debts for property, more wisely and judi-
ciously contracted, are, at least, as justly entitled to relief by repudia-
tion as any of those quondam slaveholders." 116 Comparing creditors
for slaves and debtors for slaves, moreover, there seems to be no rea-
son to suppose that creditors as a class were significantly wealthier
than debtors-disregarding, again, the transfer of wealth that enforce-
ment would bring about. Unlike credit transactions in general, in
which people with greater wealth must tend to be creditors of people
with less, the sale of slaves on credit appears to have taken place for
the most part between people whose economic circumstances were
roughly comparable.
The political appeal of "relief for purchasers of slaves" would be
readily explained if, as was sometimes asserted, the creditors on slave
contracts were typically professional slave traders while the debtors
were plantation owners. William J. Whipper painted one such portrait
before the South Carolina convention:
If certain parties who dealt in human flesh, men who brought slaves
to this country, or men whose province it was to sell slaves to the
man who cultivated the land, who made their living and their for-
tunes from selling human flesh, have not succeeded in obtaining
their money, I am not one desirous or willing to assist them in ob-
taining it.... Who is [the debt] to be paid to? It is to be paid to the
men who traded all his life in slave property, who made their money
by it, and who secured passage of that odious fugitive slave law
which enabled them to go North, hunt down freemen and bring
them to South Carolina and sell them .... 117
Whipper, it should be remembered, had only recently arrived in South
Carolina from Ohio, and his ideas about the slave trade inevitably
owed more to Uncle Tom's Cabin than to any knowledge of the
Charleston slave market. The picture of the interstate trader as prin-
cipal creditor on "slave contracts" was particularly implausible in
South Carolina, because the state had been a substantial net exporter
of slaves, second only to Virginia, since the 1820s. 118
The weight of the available evidence suggests, on the contrary,
that professional traders are relatively unlikely to figure as creditors
116. SOUTH CARONA CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION, supra note 72, at 200-01; Hume,
supra note 96, at 454.
117. SoUTH CAROLINA CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION, supra note 72, at 124-25.
118. See TADMAN, supra note 66, tbl. 2.1 at 12.
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on the debts that interest us. Despite one salient piece of conflicting
evidence-a celebrated suit over slave contracts that reached the
Supreme Court in 1841 119-modern analysis of traders' business
records suggests that dealers were rarely if ever willing to sell for the
long-term paper typically involved in the slave contract cases. An au-
thoritative recent study by Michael Tadman, summarizing the results
of his own and others' research into the records of slave trading firms,
concludes that the professional trader had a "very strong preference
for payment in cash or its near equivalent"-the usual equivalent be-
ing acceptances of sixty or ninety days' maturity. 120 New studies
based on court records confirm the inference drawn from traders' ac-
counts: that the ordinary commercial sale of slaves was almost always
for cash or short credit. 121 It is significant, therefore, not only that the
119. Groves v. Slaughter, 40 U.S. (15 Pet.) 449 (1841). The famous commerce-clause case of
Groves v. Slaughter began as an attempt to enforce a buyer's notes for $7,000 and $7,875, at
twelve and twenty-four months, respectively, in the face of a clause in the Mississippi constitu-
tion of 1832 forbidding the importation of slaves for sale within the state. (The defendants in
Groves were accommodation endorsers, not makers, of the notes sued upon. As such they were
probably factors of the plantation owner, who had become his sureties as the most convenient
way of extending him credit.) Henry Clay, who together with Daniel Webster appeared as coun-
sel for the slave dealer, informed the Supreme Court that the "universal habit of all the planting
States has been to buy slaves on credit, leaving the product of planting to pay for them"; and
that, in consequence, "more than three millions of dollars" was then "due by citizens of the state
of Mississippi, to citizens of Virginia, Maryland, Kentucky, and other slave states." hI. at 481-82
(arguments of counsel). Describing the same market in the same era, the historian Wendell
Stephenson reported that:
Many of the slaves sold in the Natchez market were conveyed on credit, the traders
retaining a mortgage on the property. It was not uncommon in the halcyon days pre-
ceding the Panic of 1837 for would-be planters to purchase slaves with only a small
payment, hoping that a few cotton crops would enable them to settle their notes.
WENDELL HoLMES STEPHENSON, ISAAC FRANKLIN: SLAvE TRADER AND PLANTER OF TIE OLD
SouTH 63 (1938). These assertions of Clay and Stephenson about the prevalence of credit sales,
even as regards the Natchez market of the 1830s, are not borne out by more modem research.
See infra notes 120-21.
120. TADMAN, supra note 66, at 103-05. Tadman's review of the records of one firm in the
Natchez market, between 1832 and 1834, revealed "that about 50 percent of sales were for cash,
about 35 percent were for credit not exceeding six months (mostly, in fact, 60 days credit, with a
50 percent deposit), and the remaining 15 percent or so were on credit not exceeding twelve
months." Id. at 104. Other studies cited by Tadman showed a consistently high percentage of
sales for cash and short-term acceptances. i at 104-05 & n.39.
121. Based on his survey of recorded sales of slaves in East Feliciana Parish, Louisiana, for
the years 1847, 1850, 1853, 1856, and 1859, Richard H. Kilbourne concludes not only that credit
sales of slaves were relatively infrequent (accounting for about 20 percent of the total dollar
market for slaves), but that the credit extended in such sales was usually short-term: "Credit
sales of slaves rarely had terms of longer than twelve months, whereas credit sales of land usually
provided for extending payments over a period of two to five years." Kilbourne, supra note 1, at
52. (Recorded sales are here a reliable index of total sales: "The particulars of Louisiana's law of
public registry for immovable property.., ensured that all transactions within the parish involv-
ing land and slaves were recorded. . . ." Id. at 51.) Similarly, a recent survey of Natchez court
records by Ariela Gross supports Michael Tadman's conclusions based on the Natchez traders'
accounts. Gross has identified some 300 cases of civil litigation in the Natchez courts between
1798 and 1861 in which the personal character of a slave was put in issue. At least a third of
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sales that concern us were made on credit, but that the notes at issue
typically provided extended credit terms.122 Staggered maturities run-
ning from one to three, four, or five years seem to have been the most
common, and substantially longer maturities appear as well. 2 3
Tadman reports that in local slave markets-including both pri-
vate and public local sales, as distinguished from the interregional
slave trade-"the overwhelming tendency was to sell, not for cash, but
for long credit (most often a down payment of about one third, and
the balance with interest over one, two, or three years)."'1 24 Other
observers support Tadman's finding that purchasers at judicial sales,
unlike purchasers from dealers, were accustomed to buy on long
credit. 125 Long-term debts for slaves were very often created when a
plantation was sold on the death of the owner, either as a going con-
cern or "broken up." Even where slaves were to be sold separately at
auction, a court order directing the judicial sale might specify standard
credit terms.'2 6 Executors of decedents' estates figure prominently as
plaintiffs in the reported cases; defendants are not infrequently family
these were warranty actions against sellers; the others typically involved torts and contracts for
hire. Where the underlying transactions in Gross's sample involved sales by professional deal-
ers, such sales were almost uniformly for cash or short credit. E-mail from Ariela Gross to the
author (Oct. 24, 1994) (on file with author); see generally Ariela Julie Gross, "Pandora's Box":
Slave Character on Trial in the Antebellum Deep South (Ph.D. dissertation in progress, Stanford
University).
122. Notes of less than one-year maturity are uncommon in these cases. Rare exceptions
include: Osbom v. Nicholson, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 654 (1871) (nine months); Whitmer v. Nail's
Ex'r, 2 Ky. Op. 361 (1868) (six months); and Douglass v. Cross, 46 Tenn. (6 Cold.) 416 (1869)
(eleven months).
123. See, e.g., Roundtree v. Baker, 52 II1. 241 (1869) (twenty years); Porter v. Ralston, 69 Ky.
(6 Bush) 665 (1869) (twenty years); Calhoun v. Calhoun, 2 S.C. 283 (1870) (notes payable in five
annual installments, commencing ten years from date).
124. TADMAN, supra note 66, at 137.
125. Of 800 slaves sold by one master in chancery for the Charleston District of South Caro-
lina in the period 1851-1859, "14 percent were sold for cash, 26 percent were sold for half cash
and the balance paid in twelve months, and the rest (60 percent) were sold on a credit of two to
three years." TADMAN, supra note 66, at 137 n.5. A recent study of judicial sales of slaves in
South Carolina confirms that "long, inexpensive credit" was "the usual possibility at equity court
and probate sales," while noting that a third form of judicial sale-the sheriff's sale, under the
auspices of the law courts-was typically made for cash. Thomas D. Russell, South Carolina's
Largest Slave Auctioneering Firm, 68 Cm.-KET L. Rav. 1241, 1270 n.95 (1993). In his study of
antebellum credit relationships in East Feliciana Parish, Louisiana, Richard H. Kilbourne ob-
serves that "although many, if not most, probate sales were simply mechanisms for partitioning
estate property among coheirs," the credit terms customary at probate sales "were sufficient to
attract unrelated third-party purchasers, and such sales offered a rare opportunity to purchase
slaves on twelve months', and sometimes twenty-four months', credit." KILaouNE, supra note
1, at 55.
126. One Tennessee case, for example, reports a court order "directing the clerk of said
court, to sell said slaves to the highest bidder, on a credit of twelve months, taking from the
purchaser notes with securities for the payment of the purchase-money, except the sum of $100,
which was required to be paid in cash." Young v. Thompson, 42 Tenn. (2 Cold.) 596,597 (1865).
In another, "The slaves were directed to be sold on a credit of twelve months, with the lands at
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members. 127 The slave contract creditor, in fact, was far more likely to
be a widow or an orphan than a dealer.128
We may assume then, as a working hypothesis, that the typical
long-term debt for slaves was created when one plantation owner
bought or hired slaves from another plantation owner (or from his
estate), without the intermediary of the professional slave dealer, and
that both debtors and creditors belonged to a relatively wealthy seg-
ment of the southern white population. What facts distinguished cred-
itors and debtors on outstanding slave contracts in 1867 and 1868 that
might help to explain why nullification of slave debts-involving the
relief of debtors at the expense of creditors-enjoyed such widespread
appeal as a political program?
Those slave contracts most clearly in view had been entered into
shortly before the war, or after its inception. (The resolution offered
in the Virginia convention applied, by its terms, only to debts for
slaves contracted after January 1, 1860.129) The transactions that were
reversed, as between buyer and seller, were those in which slaves had
been sold during the twilight of slavery as an institution. Prices were
falling sharply. 13° Sellers at this period were those slaveholders who
were prepared to sell slaves-and slavery-short. Buyers were those
who stood ready to buy slaves in a falling market, and who lost their
property with slavery's demise.
The distinction, with its political overtones, was clearly present to
the minds of contemporary observers. Judicial opinions, as we have
already seen, referred to the political calculation that after a certain
point was inherent in every slave bargain. "Each party had the same
means of knowing the future condition of the slave," wrote the Texas
Supreme Court, "and acted upon his own ideas as to the result of the
war. That the cause which proved mortal to slavery would soon sweep
one and two years, with bonds and security for the payment of the purchase money." Polk v.
Heirs of Pledge, 45 Tenn. (5 Cold.) 384, 385 (1868).
127. A study of Maryland court records (Anne Arundel County) for the period 1831-1844
found that 40 percent of all slaves included in decedents' estates were sold to relatives of the
decedent; another 40 percent were sold outside the family (including sales to traders); while the
executors' ultimate disposition of the remaining 20 percent was unknown. See William
Calderhead, How Extensive was the Border State Slave Trade? A New Look, 18 Civ. WAR HIST.
42, 47 (1972).
128. For references-by no means jocular-to widows and orphans as creditors, see SoUTH
CAROLINA CONSTrrUTIONAL CONVENTION, supra note 72, at 221,244. Criticizing the slave con-
tract clause of the proposed Arkansas constitution, a hostile editorial charged that it would
"sweep away the property of thousands, many of whom are widows and orphan children." AR-
KANSAS GAZETTE (Little Rock), Feb. 29, 1868, at 2, col. 1.
129. See infra app. p. 537.
130. See supra note 66.
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over the land was apparent to some, and disbelieved by others."' 131 In
a case involving the sale of a slave in August 1864-slavery ended in
Texas, the court had found, only in June 1865-its tone was even
darker: "Those who speculated upon the success of the rebellion
against the United States, and made contracts founded upon chances
of this success will not be heard in the courts of the United States in
their request for relief from the iniquitous contracts."'1 32
Southern-born delegates to the South Carolina convention, both
black and white, may have been more sensitive to this relation be-
tween buyer and seller than were their northern-born colleagues. Ac-
cording to white Unionist Simeon Corley, "those who are indebted for
slaves were stronger props in the rebellion than those who felt slavery
insecure, and sold out."'1 33 Still more telling remarks were offered by
Francis L. Cardozo, a free mulatto native of Charleston: 34
The buyer not only received the value of his money, but he bought
that slave in the midst of a war waged for the abolition of slavery,
the comer stone of the war. Every person of ordinary intelligence
knew that the existence of slavery was involved in that contest, and
yet, in the face of all these circumstances, the buyer of men goes
forward and says I will receive your slaves; I will pledge myself to
pay five or ten thousand dollars for them. Notwithstanding all the
risks I run, I will take them ....
The buyer had already suffered the loss of his slave, and those who
would cancel his debt were anxious to make the seller suffer as well:
That is the true character of the Ordinance. We are trying to make
the seller suffer also.... But there is more involved in this question
than any gentleman on the opposite side has referred to. These are
the last dying throes of the slaveholder.... [The measure] is only to
benefit a class, the buyers, and punish the sellers of slaves. 135
"The last dying throes of the slaveholder," as Cardozo aptly ex-
pressed it, were the claims for reparation on behalf of the last slave-
holders: those who still held slaves when others had sold out, those in
131. The Emancipation Proclamation Cases (Hall v. Keese), 31 Tex. 504, 527 (1868).
132. Algier v. Black, 32 Tex. 168, 169-70 (1869).
133. SOUTH CAROLINA CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION, supra note 72, at 200.
134. "Born in Charleston, the son of prominent Jewish businessman and economist Isaac N.
Cardozo and a free black mother, Cardozo was educated in a school for free blacks in the city."
FONER, supra note 85, at 39. Cardozo studied at the University of Glasgow and at Presbyterian
seminaries in Britain; he served as wartime pastor of a New Haven church before returning to
South Carolina to organize mission schools for freedmen. Cardozo became "the first black state
official in South Carolina's history," serving first as Secretary of State (1868-1872), then Treas-
urer (1872-1877). He spent the last twenty-five years of his life in Washington, D.C. as "part of
the city's upper-crust black society," employed first as a clerk in the Treasury Department, later
as principal of a black high school. Id.
135. SOUTH CAROLINA CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION, supra note 72, at 227-29.
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whose hands slave property had ceased to exist. Ultimately, the most
striking fact distinguishing buyers from sellers on the last slave con-
tracts is that the sellers gave up on slavery before the buyers did. Car-
dozo thought this a reason to let the buyers suffer the consequences:
"I think we should not go one foot out of our way to help them."'1 6 In
the eyes of some other southerners, the same fact enhanced the buy-
ers' claim to relief.
Depending on the viewpoint of the observer, the nullification of
slave debts was thus either the last tribute due to loyalty, or the last
exaction of a Bourbon class, advanced in the name of its final repre-
sentatives. Inevitably it was both at once, besides being (in the eyes of
others still) the final vindication of longstanding abolitionist doctrine
on the illegality of slavery by natural law. A single proposal carried
protean significations that were inextricably intertwined. Its manifold
possibilities explain something of the interest that the question held
for Reconstruction southerners, while they warn us against deciding
the question too quickly for ourselves.
CONCLUSION
To many modern observers it appears painfully obvious that a
suit to enforce a debt for slaves should not be cognizable in the courts
of a free nation. The reasons advanced today were voiced a hundred
twenty-five years ago. On its face, the adjudication of legal claims
that rest on a right of property in human beings appears repugnant to
our most basic political values. Courts will not enforce bargains be-
tween thieves; why then should they concern themselves with the dis-
putes of former slaveowners? It is logically impossible, moreover-
for the reasons developed in the South Carolina debate- to enforce a
slave contract without finding that the plaintiff gave good considera-
tion, hence that men could be property. An assertion that the nation
has so solemnly disavowed must henceforth, one might think, be inad-
missible in the courts.
To contemporaries these answers were not obvious. The reasons
help to illuminate, from an unaccustomed perspective, the accommo-
dation made by a newly free nation with its slave past.
It was not possible, to begin with, for the courts to occupy moral
high ground that was plainly marked out: for instance, to repudiate
slavery simply by refusing to hear claims premised on its former exist-
136. 1& at 228.
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ence. Under the circumstances, a judicial refusal to intervene in the
matter (by refusing to try the parties' case) inevitably constituted an
intervention of another sort. By closing the courthouse door to one
class of plaintiffs, a judge might avoid hearing their disputes; but he
could do so only by altering a rule of law in favor of the corresponding
class of defendants, likewise former slaveholders and, some thought,
"stronger props in the rebellion"' 37 than those whose suit was now
rejected.
To refuse to hear the case was therefore to decide it. And to
decide the case in favor of the buyer of slaves, whatever the grounds
on which the court denied the seller's suit, was, as a matter of com-
mercial law, to decide it wrong. Sellers won all the arguments in terms
of ordinary doctrine because well-established contract principles (war-
ranty, allocation of risk, res perit domino) all came out the sellers'
way. This is not to say that the slave contracts should necessarily have
been treated as ordinary commercial disputes: that, of course, is what
the argument was about. It is to say, however, that to decide them
other than as ordinary commercial disputes carried a social cost that
judges, unless persuaded of the strength of countervailing considera-
tions, would ordinarily seek to avoid. That cost consisted in the unset-
tling of expectations about legal rules in an area, that of commercial
relationships, where fixed and uniform expectations about governing
rules are rightly felt to be especially valuable.
Countervailing considerations did exist, but only in a peculiarly
abstract and attenuated form. The reasons not to treat slave contracts
like other contracts pertained to what Otto Kirchheimer has styled
"political justice": the use of judicial forms "to bolster or create new
power positions," most notably in the trial and condemnation of a
vanquished regime by its victorious successor.' 38 A refusal to enforce
debts for slaves would have constituted, as we have seen, a retrospec-
tive judgment on the regime in which slavery had been possible.
Commercial law might here have yielded to a political justice that de-
nied the legality of slavery even where slavery was legally ordained.
The succession of regimes in the Reconstruction South might in-
deed have been the occasion of political justice in more direct and
classic forms, such as prosecutions for treason and property redistribu-
tion. The striking fact is that it was not:
137. See supra note 133 and accompanying text.
138. OTro KIRCHHEIMER, POLITICAL JUSTICE: THE USE OF LEGAL PROCEDURE FOR POLrT-
ICAL ENDS vii, ch. 8 (1961).
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No mass arrests followed the collapse of the Confederacy; only
Henry Wirtz, commandant of Andersonville prison camp, paid the
ultimate penalty for treason. Jefferson Davis spent two years in fed-
eral prison but was never put on trial and lived to his eighty-second
year; his Vice President, Alexander H. Stephens, served a brief im-
prisonment, returned to Congress in 1873, and died ten years later
as governor of Georgia. 139
The political disabilities imposed by the third section of the Four-
teenth Amendment, barring former rebels from state or federal office,
were removed by general amnesty only four years after they went into
effect.140 Meanwhile, recurring proposals "to overturn the plantation
system and provide the former slaves with homesteads" (in the shape
of "forty acres and a mule") remained, as Eric Foner has written, "[a]t
the outer limits of Radical Republicanism,"'' 41 never to be seriously
attempted.
The absence of these more radical measures reminds us how lim-
ited was the political revolution that Reconstruction imposed on the
southern states. A retroactive revision of property relations is easily
within the province of political justice, forming the basis of all confis-
cation and reallocation programs, but no such revision was attempted
by the Thirteenth Amendment. Except for the denial of compensa-
tion to former slaveowners-the implications of which, in the circum-
stances of war, could be no more than ambiguous-nothing in
national policy drew into question the former legality of slavery wher-
ever slavery had existed by positive law. Slavery was ended from this
day forward, but its previous existence was not challenged.
The arguments against enforcing slave contracts required, on the
contrary, that emancipation be made retroactive. A suit between for-
mer slaveowners resembled a suit between thieves, a note given for
the purchase of a slave lacked consideration, only if the courts were
prepared to declare that slavery had always been as illegal as the
country had now made it. This was precisely the neoabolitionist con-
tention, but to give it practical effect would have involved the nation
in a political revolution that Reconstruction did not envision. The
Constitution of 1787 had allowed the states to maintain the institution
of slavery. The Thirteenth Amendment altered that Constitution but
did not seek to overthrow it.
139. FONER, supra note 6, at 190.
140. The General Amnesty Act removed the constitutional disability of all persons "except
Senators and Representatives of the thirty-sixth and thirty-seventh Congresses, officers in the
judicial, military and naval service of the United States, heads of departments, and foreign minis-
ters of the United States." Act of May 22, 1872, 17 Stat. 142.
141. FONER, supra note 6, at 235.
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APPENDIX
CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS
(PROPOSED OR ENACTED)
PROHIBITING THE ENFORCEMENT OF
DEBTS FOR SLAVES
Alabama:
SEC. 3. And be it further ordained, and it is hereby declared,
That there is a failure of consideration, and it shall be so held by the
courts of the State, upon all deeds or bills of sale, given for slaves,
with covenants of warranty of title or soundness, or both, and upon
all bills, bonds, notes, or other evidences of debt, given for or in
consideration of slaves, which are now outstanding and unpaid, and
no action shall be maintained thereon, and that all judgments and
decrees rendered in any of the courts of this State since the 11th day
of January, 1861, upon any deeds or bills of sale, or upon any bond,
bill, note, or other evidence of debt based upon the sale or purchase
of slaves, are hereby declared set aside, and the plea of failure of
consideration shall be held a good defense in all actions to said suit;
Provided, That settlements and compromises of such transactions,
made between the parties thereto, shall be respected.
Alabama Constitutional Convention, Ordinance No. 38, § 3 (Dec. 6,
1867), 1868 Ala. Acts 185, 186. This section of Alabama's debt-relief
ordinance was held unconstitutional in McElvain v. Mudd, 44 Ala. 48,
62 (1870). The author of the opinion, Chief Justice E. Wolsey Peck,
served as president of the constitutional convention before his elec-
tion to the state supreme court. Peck opposed the relief measure on
the floor of the convention, declaring that "it was wholly unconstitu-
tional and would not stand a test in the courts." MOBILE DAILY AD-
VERTISER AND REGISTER, Dec. 7, 1867, at 2, col. 4.
Arkansas:
All contracts for the sale or purchase of slaves are null and
void, and no court of this State shall take cognizance of any suit
founded on such contracts, nor shall any amount ever be collected
or recovered on any judgment or decree which shall have been, or
which hereafter may be, rendered on account of any such contract
or obligation, on any pretext, legal or otherwise.
ARK. CONST. of 1868, art. XV, § 14. Compare the proposed ordinance
to the same effect in DEBATES AND PROCEEDINGS OF THE CONVEN-
TION TO FORM A CONSTITUTION FOR THE STATE OF ARKANSAS 195
(1868). The constitutional provision was held unconstitutional in




SEC. 26. It shall be the duty of the courts to consider that there
is a failure of consideration, and it shall be so held by the courts of
this State, upon all deeds or bills of sale given for slaves with cove-
nant or warrantee of title or soundness, or both; upon all bills,
bonds, notes, or other evidences of debt, given for or in considera-
tion of slaves, which are now outstanding and unpaid, and no action
shall be maintained thereon; and all judgments and decrees ren-
dered in any of the courts of this State since the 10th day of January,
A. D. 1861, upon all deeds or bills of sale, or upon any bond, bill,
note, or other evidence of debt based upon the sale or purchase of
slaves, are hereby declared set aside, and the plea of failure of con-
sideration shall be held a good defence in all actions to said suit; and
that when money was due previous to the 10th day of January, 1861,
and slaves were given in consideration for such money, there shall
be deemed a failure of consideration for the debt: Provided, That
settlements and compromises of such transactions made between
the parties thereto shall be respected.
FLA. CONST. of 1868, art. XVII, § 26. Florida's constitutional provi-
sion was hastily adapted from Alabama's ordinance, as a comparison
of the two makes clear. It was held unconstitutional in McNealy v.
Gregory, 13 Fla. 417 (1870).
Georgia:
SEC. 17. One. No court or officer shall have, nor shall the gen-
eral assembly give, jurisdiction or authority to try or give judgment
on or enforce any debt, the consideration of which was a slave or
slaves, or the hire thereof.
GA. CONST. of 1868, art. V, § 17. The Georgia Supreme Court held
this provision constitutional in Shorter v. Cobb, 39 Ga. 285 (1869); the
United States Supreme Court held it unconstitutional in White v.
Hart, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 646 (1872), rev'g 39 Ga. 306 (1869).
The clause as passed on by the courts was all that remained of the
original "relief' provision of Georgia's 1868 constitution. Congress
had imposed as a "fundamental condition" of Georgia's readmission
to representation:
that the first and third subdivisions of section seventeen of the fifth
article of the constitution of said State, except the proviso to the
first subdivision, shall be null and void, and that the general assem-
bly of said State by solemn public act shall declare the assent of the
State to the foregoing fundamental condition.
Act of June 25, 1868, ch. 70, 15 Stat. 73. As originally submitted to
Congress, the first subdivision of section 17 read as follows:
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I. No Court in this State shall have jurisdiction to try or deter-
mine any suit against any resident of this State upon any contract or
agreement made or implied, or upon any contract made in renewal
of any debt existing prior to the first day of June, 1865. Nor shall
any Court or ministerial officer of this State have authority to en-
force any judgment, execution or decree rendered or issued upon
any contract or agreement made or implied, or upon any contract in
renewal of a debt existing prior to the first day of June, 1865, except
in the following cases:
1. In suits against trustees ....
2. In suits for the benefit of minors ....
3. In suits against corporations in their corporate capacity, but
not so as to enforce the debt against the stockholders or officers
thereof in their individual capacity.
4. In suits by charitable or literary institutions ....
5. In suits on debts due for mechanical or manual labor, when
the suit is by the mechanic or laborer.
6. In cases when the debt is set up by way of defence, and the
debt set up exceeds any debt due by defendant to plaintiff of which
the Courts are denied jurisdiction.
7. In all other cases in which the General Assembly shall by law
give the said Courts and officers jurisdiction: Provided, that no
Court or officer shall have, nor shall the General Assembly give
jurisdiction or authority to try or give judgment on or enforce any
debt, the consideration of which was a slave or slaves, or the hire
thereof.
GEORGIA CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION, supra note 7, at 556-57
Ordinances "to declare illegal, null and void, all notes, bonds and ex-
ecutions for the purchase of slaves" and "for the relief of purchasers
of slaves" had at one point been offered to the convention, id. at 81,
94, but with the inclusion of the proviso just quoted the proposed ordi-
nances became superfluous.
Louisiana:
ART. 128. Contracts for the sale of persons are null and void,
and shall not be enforced by the courts of this State.
LA. CONST. of 1868, tit. VI, art. 128. The constitutional provision was
a distillation of resolutions, introduced early in the convention, pro-
posing to nullify debts for slaves. See JOURNAL OF THE PROCEEDINGS
OF THE LOUISIANA CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION 59 (1868) (pro-
ceedings of Dec. 12, 1867). The Louisiana Supreme Court declined to
pass on the constitutionality of the provision: because debts for slaves
were unenforceable in Louisiana as a matter of contract law, the con-
stitutional prohibition was without effect. Dranguet v. Rost, 21 La.
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Ann. 538 (1869); accord, Palmer v. Marston, 81 U.S. (14 Wall.) 10
(1872).
Mississippi:
Whereas, Much of the present pecuniary embarrassment of the
people and consequent depression of their energies, result from
their indebtedness for the purchase of slaves; and
Whereas, By the late war, all property in them has been lost by
the mutual wrong doings of buyer and seller, and by the acts and
doings of the people of Mississippi and of the United States,
through their public authorities, whereby contracts for such prop-
erty have been not only impaired, but totally destroyed, and as pub-
lic policy and justice to all concerned, demands relief from all
obligations so incurred; therefore,
Be it ordained by this Convention, the people and Congress con-
curring, That all pecuniary liabilities of every sort, on account of the
purchase of such property, are hereby declared void, and no process
shall hereafter issue from any court of law or equity in this State to
enforce them.
The foregoing ordinance, introduced in Mississippi's constitutional
convention on February 14, 1868, was referred to committee and
never taken up; a similar ordinance, introduced on March 23, 1868,
appears to have met the same fate. JOURNAL OF THE PROCEEDINGS
IN THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF THE STATE OF MISSISSIPPI
197-98, 402-03 (1868).
North Carolina:
On January 21, 1868, a member of the North Carolina convention
presented "a Memorial from the Citizens of Bladen County, asking
'that Obligations incurred in the purchase of slaves be annulled."'
The memorial was referred to the Committee on the Judicial Depart-
ment. It does not appear that the topic was taken up again. JOURNAL
OF THE NORTH CAROLINA CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION 45 (1868).
South Carolina:
SEC. 34. All contracts, whether under seal or not, the consider-
ation of which were for the purchase of slaves, are hereby declared
null and void and of no effect, and no suit, either at law or equity,
shall be commenced or prosecuted for the enforcement of such con-
tracts, and all proceedings to enforce satisfaction or payment of
judgments or decrees rendered, recorded, enrolled, or entered upon
such contracts, in any Court of this State, are hereby prohibited, and
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all orders heretofore made in any Court of this State in relation to
such contracts, whereby property is held subject to decision as to
the validity of such contracts, are also hereby declared null and void
and of no effect.
S.C. CONST. of 1868, art. IV, § 34. The provision is identical in sub-
stance to an ordinance enacted by the Constitutional Convention on
February 4, 1868. SOUTH CAROLINA CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION,
supra note 72, at 249. Both the ordinance and the constitutional pro-
vision were held unconstitutional in Calhoun v. Calhoun, 2 S.C. 283
(1871).
Texas:
A resolution offered in the Texas Constitutional Convention on
July 8, 1868 would have instructed the Committee on the Judiciary "to
inquire into the expediency of the adoption of a declaration or resolu-
tion, declaring null and void, and of no effect, all notes, judgments,
and promises to pay whatever, given, obtained, or made for the
purchase of slaves, since the date of emancipation proclamation."
(No resolution in this sense appears to have been adopted.) JOURNAL
OF THE TEXAS RECONSTRUCTION CONVENTION 247-48 (1870).
Virginia:
Resolved, That all debts contracted, and obligations incurred,
by the purchase or sale of slaves since January 1st, 1860, be declared
null and void, in view of the fact that no just remuneration was re-
ceived for the obligation or debts thus incurred.
The foregoing resolution was offered in the Virginia Constitutional
Convention on December 14, 1867, and referred to the Committee on
the Judiciary. VIRGINIA CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION, supra note
11, at 98. On December 19 the Committee issued a formal report rec-
ommending unanimously against the adoption of the resolution: be-
cause "the power to pass any law or ordinance impairing the
obligation of contracts is expressly denied to the State ... this Con-
vention has no authority to act in the premises whatever." Id. at 135-
36. In mid-January, a proposal for general debt relief-calling for the
wholesale repudiation of debts contracted prior to April 9, 1865-met
a similar rebuke from the Judiciary Committee in another formal re-
port. Id. at 442, 496-98. The Committee's rejection of any relief meas-
ures was subsequently debated and sustained by the Convention, the
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vote being 72-6. DAILY ENQUIRER AND EXAMINER (Richmond, Va.),
Feb. 11, 1868, at 1, col. 3.
Federal:
A BILL
To prevent the courts of the United States from enforcing contracts
concerning slaves.
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the
United States of America in Congress assembled, That the courts of
the United States shall not have cognizance of any suit to recover
the contents of any promissory note, or other chose in action, or for
the enforcement of any contract, given or made, wholly or in part,
for the price of any person held in slavery or involuntary servitude:
Provided, however, That the holder of any promissory note, who
took the same before maturity, without notice of the nature of the
consideration, shall not be affected thereby.
Sec. 2. And be it further enacted, That whenever any suit shall
be pending in any court of the United States on any such obligation,
or for the enforcement of any such contract as is described in the
first section of this act, the court shall, on its own motion, dismiss
the same.
Sec. 3. And be it further enacted, That all acts and parts of acts
in conflict with the provisions of this act be, and the same are
hereby, repealed.
S. 254, 41st Cong., 1st Sess. (1869). Senator Charles Sumner of Massa-
chusetts introduced the foregoing bill on April 5, 1869. CONG.
GLOBE, 41st Cong., 1st Sess. 492 (1869). It was referred to the Com-
mittee on the Judiciary, ordered to be printed, and never heard from
again.
[Vol. 70:493
